This comprehensive OSINT-driven analytical work, led by Manon-Catherine Balbinot, draws on two concurrent conflicts that define the current transformation of warfare.

For the full pdf, reach out to us at team@challengerresearchgroup.com.

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When historians write about the fracturing of the post-Cold War order, the common milestone will be Russia's invasion of Ukraine or Trump's return to the White House. We disagree. Both events were catalysts, not causes. The deeper inflection point is less visible and more consequential: the moment Europe began building genuine defence autonomy. That moment is coming, and few have fully absorbed what it means for the world.

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For three decades, European defence spending was the subject of polite American frustration. Under Donald Trump, it became decidedly less polite. The 2% of GDP target sat unmet, the equipment aged, and the political will was absent. Then Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and Donald Trump returned to the White House. The calculation changed with a speed that has surprised almost everyone, including those who had been demanding it for years.

Europe is now rearming in earnest, and that success is reshaping geopolitics in ways that are catastrophic for Russia, critical for Ukraine, and corrosive of American leverage. It is worth being precise about all three.

The Numbers Are Real This Time

According to the European Defence Agency, EU member state defence spending is projected to reach €381 billion in 2025, a 63% increase in constant price terms since 2020, and the first time the bloc has collectively exceeded the 2% of GDP threshold. Germany spent $88.5 billion on defence in 2024, a 28% rise in a single year, becoming the fourth largest military spender on earth. Sweden surged 34% to $12 billion in its first year as a NATO member. Poland allocated 4.2% of GDP, more than any other NATO member, and has pledged to reach 4.7 % in 2025. Denmark, Finland, and Norway all met or exceeded 2%.

At the Hague Summit in June 2025, NATO members (except Spain) pledged to reach 5% of GDP in defence and security spending by 2035. European defence tech funding rose from €200 million in 2021 to €2.6 billion in 2025. European defence primes including Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Saab, Leonardo, and Thales are reporting order books at multi-decade highs, with the sector delivering approximately a 400% total shareholder return since 2022.

The map below, sampled from Our World in Data (2025), demonstrates the geography underpinning levels of urgency. Unsurprisingly, countries spending most aggressively share borders with Russia or sit within its operational reach. This is not moral burden-sharing the EU want to project to the world.

Figure 1. Our World in Data map of European defence spending as a share of GDP in 2024, using SIPRI (2025) data.

For example, Spain increased spending by just 0.4% in 2024, among the lowest in NATO, and only reached the 2% threshold in 2025 after a decade of stagnation in which real defence expenditure only recently recovered to pre-2008 levels. Italy followed a similar trajectory. Greece is a partial exception, spending above 2% of GDP for years. Though, its motivation is the Aegean and Turkey rather than the eastern front.

These examples confirm the deeper geographic divide. The strategic centre of gravity in European defence has shifted decisively north and east, where the danger is greatest, and there is no credible path for it to shift back. Luckily for Europe, the important economic engines of Germany, France, Poland and the Nordics all reside within what we shall call the “existentially concerned about Russia” category. The consequence of which is that Europe is effectively rearming.

The critical constraint is timing. Defence procurement does not operate on commercial timelines. Industrial lead times for air defence systems, armoured vehicles and artillery typically run 18 to 36 months from contract signature, and often longer for complex systems. Even these timelines assume available industrial capacity, which in many cases no longer exists at scale.

Iran learnt this the hard way. Iran’s €500 million order of Russian Verba MANPADS, covering 500 launchers and 2,500 missiles, would drastically change the air battlespace, making low altitude flying too risky. Yet, the order is not set to be completed until between 2027 and 2029, well beyond any immediate operational need. This was likely a core reason behind Israel’s pushing of Trump to strike Iran this year.

Contracts are being signed today for wars that are already being fought. The gap between spending and fielded capability is measured not in months, but in years.

McKinsey’s February 2026 analysis confirmed that total equipment stocks in European NATO countries remain below their 2021 levels, reflecting donations to Ukraine, retirement of legacy systems, and long delivery timelines for replacements. Germany’s constitutional debt-brake amendment, passed in March 2025 to unlock €500 billion for defence and infrastructure, only now has procurement cycles reaching contract stage. The money is real. The hardware will not follow until 2028 at the earliest.

From Dependency to Defiance: How American Foreign Policy Backfired in Europe

The Trump administration’s approach to European defence contains a strategic contradiction so fundamental it deserves to be stated plainly. Washington is simultaneously telling Europe it is alone and must defend itself, while also demanding that Europe purchase American weapons systems to do so. It is applying tariffs to European economies while insisting those same economies find hundreds of billions more for their defence budgets. It is threatening to withdraw technical and logistical support for American systems already in European inventories (the precise support that makes those systems operable) while pressing new sales of those same systems. It is telling European governments they cannot rely on the United States, then expressing alarm when European procurement frameworks are specifically designed to exclude American suppliers.

The Trump administration has a coherency problem. A less restrained assessment is that Washington is attempting to weaponise European insecurity as a captive arms market while simultaneously manufacturing that insecurity. These two objectives are in direct contradiction, and Europe has understood the game.

The EU’s ReArm Europe plan, a €150 billion loan facility for defence procurement, explicitly directs spending to European manufacturers and locks out American firms. The Pentagon is alarmed by this independence. American defence industry figures have stated publicly that European procurement autonomy directly threatens the United States’ position as the world’s top arms exporter. The EU has been unambiguous that the economic returns of rearmament will accrue to European factories and European workers. The emerging Franco-German KNDS armoured vehicle consolidation, European joint missile development, and the UK’s record Eurofighter Typhoon sale to Turkey are all indicators of a continent building not just military capability, but defence industrial sovereignty.

Every month of European rearmament is a month in which American leverage diminishes. Trump’s conduct throughout his second term, including the tariffs, the Greenland threats, the alignment with Moscow, and the public belittling of European leaders, has been the single most effective accelerant of European strategic autonomy in the post-war era. In attempting to monetise the alliance, he has dissolved the dependency that made it valuable to Washington in the first place. Once European nations can equip, sustain, and project military force without American systems and without American political approval, the transactional leverage Trump has deployed so aggressively simply ceases to exist.

Europe’s refusal to join American military operations against Iran, or to commit assets to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, is the strongest signal of defiance to date. European governments calculated, correctly, that they could absorb the diplomatic cost of saying no, and that their own security would not collapse as a result. To be clear, Europe remains genuinely vulnerable in 2026. Its air defences have gaps, its ammunition stockpiles are still recovering, and its ability to project force independently remains limited. But vulnerability and total dependence are not the same condition, and the distance between them grows by the week.

With each year of rearmament, each new procurement contract signed outside American supply chains, and each act of strategic defiance absorbed without catastrophic consequence, the psychology of the continent shifts. It is surprising even to us how much the self-defeating talk in Europe about rearmament and independence has begun to fade. Europe is becoming less afraid of the distance between where it is and where it needs to be. This has occurred despite US attempts to belittle, sow division, and incentivise the sale of American arms.

If the US strategy was to comprehensively bring Europe into its orbit against the rise of China, it has failed spectacularly. Europe looks to pursue Mark Carney’s “rise of the middle powers” philosophy, in which an alliance with the US is seen as geopolitically unwise. Even if a leader wanted to maintain those ties, it would be democratic suicide. One would be hard-pressed to find any European power whose population does not severely dislike the United States under Donald Trump, as this recent Gallup poll shows. Achieving a net approval score of minus 80 in Sweden is an impressive achievement for all the wrong reasons.

Figure 2. Gallup European poll on Trump’s popularity in Europe (Gallup 2026).

Ukraine Is Running Out of Time Before Europe Is Ready

For Ukraine, the 2028-32 capability timeline is troubling.

Russia’s defence spending reached roughly $140–150 billion in 2024, a sharp year-on-year increase, accounting for around a quarter to a third of total government expenditure, and more than 7% of total GDP (Figure 3). This 7% is likely the lower end, with some estimates pushing it as high as 10%.

Figure 3. Russian military expenditure as % of GDP between 2018-2024 (SIPRI 2025).

Moscow can read the European rearmament data as clearly as anyone in Brussels or Warsaw. The window in which Russia can achieve its objectives in Ukraine before European capability becomes operationally significant runs roughly until 2028 to 2032. European rearmament therefore does not deter Russia in the short term. It may actively accelerate Russian aggression, because Moscow’s rational incentive is to push hard now and push hard fast, before the clock runs out.

The ceasefire pressure being applied by the Trump administration compounds this danger acutely. An administration that has voted alongside Russia at the United Nations, described Zelensky as a dictator, and sequenced its peace process diplomacy in ways that Moscow has openly endorsed is not a neutral broker. A ceasefire that freezes Russian territorial gains and relieves Western governments of political pressure to maintain support would suit Russia’s timeline precisely. European capability would not arrive until after any such settlement had been locked in, and the rearmament expenditure, however historically significant, would have been spent preparing for a war that Russia had already won the preceding phase of.

What makes Ukraine’s position less concerning than the raw numbers suggest is a form of support that standard accounting frameworks cannot see. SIPRI tracks state-to-state arms transfers but does not capture European funding of Ukrainian domestic production.

This is shift in support strategy has become one of the most strategically significant and least reported developments of the entire conflict.

At the outset of the invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s domestic defence production capacity was roughly $1 billion annually. By mid-2025, Zelensky reported that figure had surpassed $35 billion in productive potential. Foreign funding channelled directly into Ukrainian production reached $6.1 billion in 2025, a tenfold increase on 2024’s $600 million, drawn from the UK, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada. Ukraine manufactured between 2.5 and 4 million drones domestically in 2025, producing 96 % of its own FPV and kamikaze drones at around $500 per unit. This is why Ukraine is holding together more effectively than formal arms transfer data would predict, particularly after American military support evaporated under Trump.

Russia’s Clock Is Also Running, Towards Economic Crisis

Russia’s urgency is not purely military. According to SIPRI’s March 2025 edition, Russia’s share of the global arms export market collapsed from approximately 21% in the period 2015 to 2019 to 7.8 % in 2020 to 2024, a fall of nearly two thirds against a rising global market. In revenue terms the picture is starker still. Russian arms exports generated $14.6 billion in 2021, falling to $8 billion in 2022, $3 billion in 2023, and below $1 billion by end 2024, a 92% collapse in three years.

It is not just because Russia itself needs this equipment. The number of countries purchasing Russian arms fell from 47 in the period 2018 to 2022 to 33 by 2024. India, historically Russia’s largest customer, reduced its reliance from 72 % of arms imports in 2010 to 2014 to just 36 % in 2020 to 2024. At the Dubai Air Show in November 2025, Rosoboronexport showcased 850 items. The majority were mock-ups.

Defence spending has been the primary driver of Russia’s 4.1% GDP growth in 2024, but this is a war economy running on borrowed time rather than a productive one. The IMF projects Russian growth slowing to 0.9% in 2025 and 1.0% in 2026 as the war boom deflates. When the conflict ends, Russia will face hot factory lines producing for an army that is no longer consuming at wartime rates, and a global export market that has been captured by Western, South Korean, and increasingly Ukrainian competitors. Countries that once bought Russian hardware for its price point will have battle-tested Ukrainian alternatives available.

The conflict in the Middle East has compounded this by prompting South Korea and Japan to soften their enforcement of Russian oil sanctions, extending Moscow’s financial runway in the short term but doing nothing to resolve the structural post-war reckoning that awaits. Russia’s urgency to end this war on favourable terms, before European rearmament arrives and before Ukrainian exports establish themselves globally, is therefore existential for Russia’s postwar economic future.

The Strategic Vulnerabilities Beneath the Spending Surge

Against record headline spending figures, Europe’s posture on counter-drone systems remains the most alarming single capability gap in the entire rearmament programme. A Russian Shahed-136 loitering munition costs between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce. The PAC-2 GEM-T missile commonly used to intercept it costs between $1 million and $2 million. That exchange rate, sustained over years, is not survivable for any defender relying on traditional intercept methods. Ukraine fires an estimated 10,000 air defence missiles annually.

Europe’s counter-UAS market is estimated at roughly $1–1.5 billion today and projected to exceed $4 billion by 2030, but procurement remains polarised between handheld jammers too limited for brigade-level protection and expensive missile systems too costly to deploy at scale against drone swarms. The market is answering the wrong question.

At the same time, the political foundations of rearmament are not as secure as the spending figures suggest. Hungary has become a focal point of external influence efforts ahead of its elections, with mounting concern across European security circles about Russian interference and broader alignment between Moscow and actors in Washington seeking to bolster Viktor Orbán’s position. Even unverified reports of potential destabilisation plots underscore the degree to which Hungary now sits within the grey zone contest.

A shift in Budapest’s posture, or the emergence of similar governments elsewhere, could obstruct EU funding mechanisms, slow collective procurement, and dilute support for Ukraine at a critical moment. Giorgia Meloni in Italy has so far governed with restraint and an awareness of market and alliance pressures, but that balance is contingent. One additional major European economy moving in a more openly obstructionist direction would materially weaken the coherence of Europe’s defence effort.

Meanwhile, the operational threat continues to scale. In September 2025, approximately twenty Russian drones entered Polish airspace in a single incident. Copenhagen Airport closed for nearly four hours following coordinated drone activity. Russian drones have flown over Belgian army bases, German military installations and Norwegian critical infrastructure. The Munich Security Report 2026 identified a sharp rise in such incursions as part of a deliberate hybrid warfare campaign. The drone wall announced by Ursula von der Leyen in her 2025 State of the Union is real as a political commitment. As an operational capability, it does not yet exist.

The Clock Is Running. So Is Europe.

European rearmament is the most significant shift in Western strategic posture since the end of the Cold War, and it is accelerating faster than most analysts expected and slower than the current threat demands. It is eroding American leverage month by month, threatening Russia’s post-war economic viability, and arriving just too slowly to decisively alter Ukraine’s position before Moscow makes its push to close the window. Crucially, part of this effort is already more effective than the headline data suggests. European funding flowing directly into Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, invisible in traditional arms transfer metrics, is producing results on the battlefield that the formal accounting cannot explain.

The next two to five years will determine whether this rearmament lands as deterrence or as a monument to what should have been fielded sooner. Russia knows this. Ukraine knows this. Washington, if it is paying attention, knows this too, though its actions suggest otherwise.

But the elephant in the room here is the one nobody in Washington wants to say aloud. Europe is not rearming because American leadership inspired it. It is rearming because American reliability collapsed. The dependency that Washington spent decades treating as strategic leverage turned out to be the alliance’s most fragile component. Once broken, it does not restore. What replaces it is a Europe that pays its own bills, makes its own calculations, and increasingly reserves the right to reach its own conclusions. That is not the multilateral order the United States built. It is what comes after. And it is already here.

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References

European Defence Agency. (2025) Defence Data 2024: Key Findings and Analysis. Brussels: European Defence Agency.

SIPRI. (2025) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: sipri.org [Accessed March 2026].

SIPRI. (2025) Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024. SIPRI Fact Sheet. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

SIPRI. (2025) SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: sipri.org [Accessed March 2026].

NATO. (2025) Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025). Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

NATO. (2025) The Hague Summit Communique. Brussels: NATO, June 2025.

International Monetary Fund. (2025) World Economic Outlook: Navigating Global Divergences. Washington DC: IMF, April 2025.

Zelensky, V. (2025) Address to the Verkhovna Rada on Ukrainian Defence Industrial Capacity. Kyiv, June 2025.

Munich Security Conference. (2026) Munich Security Report 2026. Munich: Munich Security Conference Foundation.

The EU and UK face widening governance misalignment in counter-drone defence.

Detection capability is advancing. Intervention authority is not.

Across jurisdictions, authority gaps, perception gaps and political authorisation constraints combine to produce operational hesitation. In ambiguous incidents, actors can often see the threat but lack a clear mandate to neutralise it. That hesitation is not incidental. It is structural.

Grey zone tactics exploit precisely this space. They are designed to operate below the threshold that would compel decisive political or military action, while still probing defences, mapping infrastructure and testing response limits.

Without deliberate reform, three trajectories begin to converge: airport paralysis during high-impact incidents, sustained exposure of critical infrastructure; and gradual erosion of European counter-UAS competitiveness.

None of these outcomes require open conflict. All require continued ambiguity.

Drone activity is already operational. Legal frameworks remain reactive. Until authority and capability are aligned, European airspace will remain structurally vulnerable to the very forms of hybrid activity modern adversaries are optimised to conduct.

Below is the executive summary of our cross-disciplinary assessment on Europe’s UAS Governance Gap.

We are hosting a webinar on April 7th where we will be diving into more detail.

You can register for it here: https://www.challengerresearchgroup.com/webinar-april7

By 2026, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have moved far beyond the niche expeditionary role associated with drone operations in permissive battlespaces such as Iraq. Instead, UAS now sits at the intersection of military power, regulation, industrial control, supply chain resilience, and political risk.

We are proud to publish this new executive summary, authored by J. Reeves, S. Direk, B. Strey, S. Zadesenets, A. Kaloko, G. Wightman, E. Shannon-Adams & A. Bouzas Monroy.

𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘴𝘶𝘮𝘮𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘪𝘴 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘭 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘴𝘶𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘺 𝘸𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘢𝘤𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘴 𝘨𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘳𝘢𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦-𝘢𝘥𝘫𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘹𝘵𝘴.

Helsing’s CA-1 Europa Drone. Source: Reuters.

For nearly three decades, large Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones like the US’s Predator and Reaper have been the backbone of Western air power - the unblinking eyes in the sky delivering intelligence and strikes with surgical precision. During the Global War on Terror, these platforms were the aerial bedrock of Western counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, and European nations have been almost entirely dependent on American and Israeli-made MALE drones.

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That dependency risks repeating itself as “loyal wingman” drones move closer to service. Western nations can’t wait until the 2040s for their development, they need them now. In the “Great Power” conflict paradigm we now find ourselves, air superiority is not guaranteed. In this environment MALE drones are liabilities, and 4^th/5^th generational fighter jets are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated air defence networks. Deploying the number of manned jets that would be needed would be too expensive – not to mention the lack of pilots in most NATO countries. Loyal wingman drones offer a solution by enabling combat mass while (hopefully) staying within budget and saving human lives.

Unfortunately for Europe, domestic initiatives are few, and to be operationally ready by the end of the decade nations are increasingly turning to the US. However, with an increasingly unreliable US under the Trump administration, Europe cannot afford to become entirely dependent on US loyal wingman drones, like during the MALE era. If it wants to achieve strategic autonomy, Europe must harmonise and properly fund domestic initiatives, and it must do it quickly.

The Shifting Geopolitical Environment: from MALE to “Loyal Wingman” Drones

MQ-9 Reaper. Photo Credit: Shutterstock.

Today’s geopolitical environment has changed from the counterinsurgency era of the past decades. Gone are the permissive skies of that battlespace, replaced by contested airspace amid a resurgence in Great Power Competition. Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones, like the MQ-9 Reaper, long the West’s aerial workhorses during the War on Terror, are now reduced to ancillary roles. Slow moving and not designed for stealth, MALE drones like the Reaper would be expensive sitting ducks in a contested airspace like the Taiwan Strait.

In Yemen, since late 2023 it’s estimated Houthi rebels have downed somewhere between 15-23 MQ-9 Reapers. To put this into perspective, since its introduction in 2007, there is only 1 confirmed instance of a Reaper being shot down.

The proliferation of sophisticated Russian and Chinese integrated defence systems (IADs) and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles have impacted not just MALE drones, but manned aircraft too. Traditional 4th and 4.5-generation jets (F-15, Typhoon, Rafale) and even 5^th-generation jets (F-35) are assessed to lack the range and extreme stealth needed to survive missions into these highly protected airspaces.

An XQ-58A Valkyrie unmanned aerial vehicle flies in formation with an F-22 Raptor and F-35A Lightning over the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground testing range, Ariz., during a series of tests (Air Force2020).

Doctrine has shifted to the development of loyal wingman drones – defined as AI-driven jet engine powered large uncrewed aircraft. The idea of loyal wingman drones is to act as cost-effective force multipliers to manned aircraft, with anywhere from 2-8 flying in a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). They can have different capabilities, like electronic warfare or air-to-air combat, giving the manned aircraft different options depending on the mission and circumstances. First-generation loyal wingman drones are being built to fly between Mach 0.8-0.9 (2-3x faster than a Reaper). While autonomous, the manned aircraft will control them using some form of interface. Loyal wingman drones will enable the combat mass needed for missions into highly protected environments and provide protection to the manned aircraft who can send them ahead.

Like during the MALE era, America is leading the way in their development. The US already has test flights, while European programs are still in the design phase. The US has a clear, unified and well-funded program through the US Air Force (USAF) to support their development – called the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. While Europe has one trilateral program between France, Germany and Spain, as part of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), and it’s at risk of collapse. Apart from that each nation is funding and developing its own program, including the UK and Italy which are part of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) – where the joint funding is to only develop the 6^th-generation jet (with Japan), not the loyal wingman drones.

US Loyal Wingman Drone Developments

Anduril’s YFQ-44A “Fury” CCA. Photo Credit: TWZ Reader.

As we enter 2026, increment 1 of the USAF’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is progressing well. The winners of increment 1 (Anduril and General Atomics (GA-ASI)) are doing test flights with prototypes, and the race between nine vendors for increment 2 is well underway. The USAF has allocated $8.9 billion so far for increment 1 of the CCA through to 2029, funding amounts for increment 2 are yet to be announced. For Anduril and General Atomic (GA-ASI) low-rate initial production (LRIP) is slated for 2027-2028, with full operational status by 2029-2030.

A number of US firms are also self-funding CCA initiatives with an eye to the USAF’s increment 2, US Marine and Navy initiatives and international sales. Lockheed Martin, through its Skunk Works subsidiary, has developed the Vectis and is aiming for test flights in 2027. Kratos Defense, the pioneer of the self-funded drone model, has developed the Valkyrie, and in a partnership with Northrop Grumman in January 2026 announced they won a US Marine contract (MUX TACAIR) using the Valkyrie as the base airframe. The Valkyrie was the first loyal wingman drone to test flight back in 2019 and is in serial production already.

Boeings MQ-28A Ghost Bat. Source: Australian Aviation.

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This analysis was prompted by a concern raised in private conversation with a highly experienced aviation professional, whose career has involved sustained engagement with airpower, threat assessment, and emerging technologies. Their observation was unsettling: major civilian events are now judged less by perimeter fencing and crowd control than by who truly controls the airspace above them.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be the largest sporting event ever staged, spanning three host nations, 16 cities, and an audience measured in billions. Yet beneath the celebratory optics, a material security divergence is emerging across North America prior to the games. Low altitude airspace is without doubt the most dangerous threat zone for the host nations.

As preparations accelerate, the United States has embarked on a historically large investment in counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS). Mexico, by contrast, appears to be pursuing a more traditional, militarised, and largely non-permanent security posture. The result is a widening aerial asymmetry that carries direct implications for risk concentration, deterrence, and high-profile attendee safety.

US Counter-Drone Architecture

In December 2025, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) formalised the first phase of a $500 million federal commitment to counter-drone security through the creation of the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Grant Program. An initial $250 million allocation was distributed to the 11 US states hosting World Cup matches, as well as the National Capital Region (FEMA, 2025).

This funding supports the deployment of layered detection and mitigation capabilities, including radio-frequency monitoring, radar, electro-optical sensors, and command-and-control integration at stadium and city levels. Crucially, the investment is not ad hoc. It is designed to create persistent, networked coverage that extends beyond the tournament itself.

The legal authority underpinning this shift is equally significant. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025, signed into law in July, expanded federal support for local counter-UAS capabilities. In parallel, the SAFER SKIES Act granted selected state and municipal law-enforcement agencies rare permissions to disrupt, disable, or seize unauthorised drones within designated security zones (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2025).

Taken together, these measures represent a structural change in how the United States governs event-level airspace. For the first time, major civilian venues will be protected by standing electronic countermeasures rather than temporary restrictions and visual enforcement.

Mexico’s Security Posture

Mexico’s preparations on the other hand, tell a more concerning story.

While Mexico City has secured approximately MX$4 billion (£180 million) in funding for tourism-related infrastructure, and the federal government is investing nearly $500 million in airport modernisation, there is limited evidence of large-scale, dedicated funding for permanent stadium-level C-UAS deployment.

Mexico’s approach appears to rely primarily on military assets rather than fixed civilian infrastructure. Although the United States, Canada, and Mexico convened a trilateral meeting in August 2025 to discuss unmanned aerial threats, Mexico’s domestic posture remains focused on mobile response units and federal military oversight (U.S. Department of State, 2025).

Mexican police using mobile anti-drone weapon to combat cartels (Credit: Abel Flores, LinkedIn).

The National Defence Emergency Response Group has demonstrated deployable anti-drone systems, but these are episodic and resource intensive. They provide coverage when present, rather than persistent denial of airspace. This distinction is critical. The US model prioritises continuous electronic surveillance and deterrence. The Mexican model prioritises physical presence and reactive capability.

Perhaps with only 3 stadiums (compared to 17 in the US), such techniques will be sufficient, yet conversations with C-UAS experts suggest that non-kinetic (jamming, cyber etc) do not work on all drones. The more sophisticated drones that cartels or other bad actors can get their hands can be impervious to such attacks. Fibre optics or pre-programmed drones.

Risk Concentration and Adversary Incentives

Security investment patterns influence adversary behaviour. Disparities in protection levels create what risk analysts describe as threat displacement: the migration of hostile intent toward softer or less technologically defended targets.

This is particularly relevant in the context of drone-enabled attacks. Consumer-grade unmanned systems have dramatically lowered the cost, complexity, and attribution threshold for aerial violence. Mexico’s organised criminal groups have been among the earliest adopters of weaponised drones, employing them for surveillance, coercion, and targeted attacks in recent years.

These actors possess both the technical expertise and local access required to exploit gaps in electronic countermeasures. In the absence of persistent C-UAS coverage, high-density venues such as the Estadio Azteca present a non-trivial exposure risk. This is especially concerning for high-profile political figures, senior officials etc.

From a protective intelligence perspective, the concern is not intent alone, but opportunity. A modified quadcopter does not need to penetrate a secure perimeter. It requires only uncontested airspace for a brief period.

Two World Cups, One Tournament

The emerging picture is not of a unified security environment, but of two distinct operating models under a single tournament banner. In the United States, the emphasis is on long-term airspace control and institutionalised counter-drone capacity. In Mexico, the emphasis seems to remain on conventional security forces and temporary deployments.

For FIFA and participating governments, the question is not whether Mexico’s approach is inadequate in absolute terms, but whether it is sufficient relative to the evolving threat landscape, in a region with known UAS usage. Drone proliferation has already altered the risk calculus for mass-gathering events. The financial and legal data suggest that only one host nation has fully internalised that shift.

Without a unified defensive posture, the 2026 World Cup risks a dangerous legacy: proving that even the most fortified ground perimeters are obsolete if the airspace remains an open flank. The true test of the tournament’s security won’t be at the turnstiles, but in the vulnerable vacuum between the stadium lights and the sky.

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The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine. Source: Shutterstock.

In the current political climate, reindustrialisation has transitioned from a campaign slogan to a core pillar of national security doctrine. Politicians in the US make increasingly grandiose promises about bringing manufacturing back. Since coming back to office, the Trump administration has unleashed a torrent of tariffs, principally aimed at reducing the deficit and reshoring production lost during the past decades of globalisation. The unfortunate truth is that reshoring the production of low-margin consumer goods provides little secondary benefits to the broader industrial base. However, a revitalised shipbuilding program would provide the structural foundation to rebuild America’s maritime and manufacturing strength.

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Building ships can do more than meet narrow security needs; if the US uses naval demand as the anchor for a broader maritime strategy, investments in new warships and shipyard capacity can rebuild the industrial base that also supports commercial shipbuilding and a revived merchant marine, creating durable, high-skill manufacturing jobs rather than just short-term “military Keynesian” stimulus.

Addressing the Indo-Pacific Reality and Shipbuilding Capacity

The United States isn’t entering a world war, but it is rapidly moving into a new era of Strategic Competition. As global power becomes more multipolar and the US faces simultaneous threats, it no longer enjoys uncontested hegemony and cannot meet every challenge at once. China is the most pressing competitor, and the US struggles to credibly project power in the Indo-Pacific without stretching its other global commitments.

The main constraint is the U.S. Navy. In its 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) objective, the Navy’s force-structure target is 381 battle force ships plus 134 unmanned surface and undersea vehicles - 515 total platforms. This number matters because it reframes today’s debate from marginal procurement choices to a structural question: whether US shipbuilding capacity can reliably produce and sustain a fleet closer to the Navy’s stated requirement, rather than oscillating around a sub-300-ship reality.

Figure 1. Large and Midsize Amphibious Warfare Ships Under the Navy’s 2024 Plan (Congressional Budget Office 2024).

The carrier strike group, long the centerpiece of American power projection, is increasingly less effective against China thanks to its anti-access/area denial envelope – specifically the proliferation of long-range precision-guided munitions forcing the US to operate at greater stand-off distances. Beyond its carriers, the US has fallen behind in producing versatile surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers, and its failed littoral combat ship program underlines its weakness in coastal operations. Amphibious capabilities are essential for contested littoral operations, but US capacity has stagnated. Figure 1 shows that even the best-case scenario yields little to no growth in fleet size, while alternative projections show a reduction in the amphibious fleet. In the Western Pacific, the Navy faces a mass and attrition problem: China now fields the world’s largest fleet, tailored to its home waters, while the US force is not configured for this contest.

If the US wants to protect its interests in the Asia-Pacific, it must modernise and expand its fleet of destroyers, frigates, and guided missile cruisers. Yet the challenge goes beyond outdated ships: the US also lacks sufficient shipbuilding capacity. CRS notes the Navy began FY2025 at 296 ships, with planned retirements that could reduce near-term fleet totals even further without sustained procurement. That near-term squeeze collides with the realities of the build pipeline: as of April 2024, the Navy had 88 ships on contract and 66 under construction, a workload that strains shipyard labour, supplier throughput, and maintenance capacity. CBO’s assessment of the Navy’s FY2025 shipbuilding plan emphasises that achieving the Navy’s stated objectives implies a sustained production tempo and funding level on the order of ~$40 billion per year (2024 dollars) over the long run. What looks like two separate problems, an aging fleet and a hollow industrial base, can instead be treated as one opportunity to rebuild both naval power and maritime manufacturing at the same time.

Through building new warships, America can revitalise its industrial base, address its national security promises, and fulfil numerous campaign promises of reindustrialisation while also rebuilding its long-neglected merchant marine. Just as the Dreadnought arms race and Cold War shipbuilding drove industrial growth, the US now has a similar opportunity. Shipbuilding can be a core pillar of modern industrial policy, advancing innovation, rebuilding manufacturing, revitalising the American Merchant Marine, and ensuring national security.

Lessons from History

During the dreadnought arms race of the early 20th century, there were rapid levels of growth in heavy industry. Arms expenditures were critical to the industrialisation of emerging nations at this time. Spain during this time invited foreign firms to build up their naval manufacturing capacity. A British consortium won this deal and helped set up the shipyards that produced Spain’s first three dreadnoughts. Due to this, Spain’s naval, metallurgical, and machine-building industries were built up in El Ferrol and Cartagena. The infrastructure needed to build dreadnoughts eventually became the infrastructure that built commercial shipping.

The human capital needed to build these warships is also readily transferable to the civilian sector. Tirpitz observed that the engineering and precision metal-working skills developed for the navy were readily transferable to civilian industries. When you train thousands of workers to build highly complicated machines, they’re able to apply this expertise to the civilian sector. This expansion of human capital and naval infrastructure would also allow for the build-out of the even more ailing civilian shipbuilding sector in the US. These shipyards also employed a lot of people.

Britain’s Armstrong-Whitworth yards on Tyneside, for example, employed around 25,000 workers (including those in associated steel and ordnance factories), while Vickers’ shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness had about 16,000 workers around 1914. In Germany, the major private shipyards building battleships together employed over 50,000 workers by 1914. While for modern shipyards these numbers would be significantly lower just due to the technological improvements, the impact is clear. Focusing on shipbuilding would dramatically increase the number of manufacturing jobs. Major US shipyards like Newport News, Bath Iron Works, and Ingalls Shipbuilding employ over 40,000 workers. Ramping up shipbuilding would allow this administration to actually make progress on promises to create manufacturing jobs in the US.

The rapid buildup of Dreadnoughts was also only made possible by the already existing shipbuilding infrastructure. According to the US Naval Institute in 1900, Germany and the British Empire had the two largest merchant marines. This laid the foundation for the dreadnought arms race, as the manufacturing process for building warships and cargo ships was very similar. The existence of infrastructure is what created this significant economic growth.

America’s past shipbuilding efforts have shown how naval demands can impact the economy. In both world wars, federal investments greatly increased yard capacity. This is necessary as drydock and shipyard capacity are huge limiting factors in shipbuilding today. The booms created by federal investment during the World Wars created massive clusters of heavy industry, like Newport News, which created significant economic activity and growth. The bust following this period of prosperity shows that declining investments can lead to national security concerns as well as poor economic growth in this sector. Europe, Japan, Korea, and, more recently, China have been investing in their shipbuilding. Since then, they have controlled a more significant portion of market share, while American market share, according to the Atlantic, has withered down to ~0.13%.

From Military Need to Commerical Fleet

The solution to this problem is accelerating naval shipbuilding. The obvious objection to this is the budget. China can build a larger navy with a budget that is a fourth of the US budget. The US already allocates roughly 14% of the federal budget (or 3.3% of GDP) to its defence. However, Naval spending is two-fold. What needs to be built is not necessarily ships, but the infrastructure for building ships. This would be done through an increased demand in naval ships, which would prompt the creation of more shipyards, drydocks, and increase the human capital needed for shipbuilding.

Also, in comparison to other military industries, shipbuilding infrastructure for warships can easily be converted to build civilian vessels. During the dreadnought arms race of the early 20th century, the countries participating in the expansion of their military fleets also had sizeable merchant marines and thus the preexisting capacity to construct significant numbers of large ships.

This could primarily be achieved through a mix of increases in naval spending, which would prompt increases in capacity from pure-play military shipbuilders like Huntington and GD’s Bath Iron Works. This, in conjunction with incentives to promote commercial shipbuilding from entities like the Commerce Department and Congress, would promote commercial shipbuilding using military infrastructure. The ideal result of these policies would be pure-play military shipbuilders like Huntington diversifying into or spinning off a commercial shipbuilding arm. America needs both commercial and military shipbuilding, and incentivising military shipbuilding would be the pathway to building the infrastructure necessary.

As opposed to the dreadnought arms race, this approach would be taking the other side. Instead of diverting commercial yards to military production, as happened in the dreadnought era, the US should do the reverse: expand shipbuilding infrastructure to meet an acute security need, but design it from the start to be dual-use. When global tensions ease, that same capacity can pivot toward commercial vessels, sustaining the workforce and yards by servicing the civilian market rather than lapsing into peacetime decay.

A Dual-Use Framework

Shipbuilding is a high-skill, high-tech industry with very strong linkages. According to “The Economic Importance of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry,” published by the Department of Transportation, roughly 107,000 direct US jobs support about 393,000 total jobs and ~$42.4B in GDP. Each yard job spins off ~2.7 jobs elsewhere, and every $1 in labour income generates about $1.82 beyond the yard. The average pay is ~$92k, which is exactly the kind of jobs that the Trump administration campaigned on bringing back.

This solution “kills 2 birds with one stone”. In a dual-use framework, those same welders, fitters, and naval architects can move between building destroyers and building tankers or container ships, so investments justified on security grounds also rebuild the commercial maritime workforce. Instead of a one-off “military Keynesian” surge, a dual-use shipbuilding strategy creates a durable industrial ecosystem that serves both the Navy and the merchant marine.

The US can respond to emerging multipolarity and great-power competition with China by investing in shipbuilding that serves both security and civilian needs. A naval buildup, if designed as part of a dual-use maritime strategy, can help America regain its footing not only in naval power but also in its long-declining commercial shipbuilding sector and merchant marine. Just as naval expansion and the growth of merchant fleets were tightly linked in the early 20th century, the United States can again build shipyards, supply chains, and skills that simultaneously strengthen the Navy, revive the merchant marine, and drive broad-based economic growth.

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References

Barwick, P.J., Myrto Kalouptsidi and Nahim Bin Zahur (2024). Industrial Policy: Lessons from Shipbuilding. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 38(4), pp.55–80. doi:https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.38.4.55.

CNA Maritime Dialogue: The US Commercial Shipbuilding Industry and National Defense. (2025). Available at: https://www.cna.org/quick-looks/2025/06/CNA-Maritime-Dialogue-Commercial-Shipbuilding-Industry-and-National%20Defense.pdf.

Funaiole, M.P. (2025). Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards. [online] Csis.org. Available at: https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-shipyard-tiers/.

Maritime Administration (2021). The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry. U.S. Department of Transportation. Available at: https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-06/Economic%20Contributions%20of%20U.S.%20Shipbuilding%20and%20Repairing%20Industry.pdf.

Maritime-Economies (2024). The U.S. shipbuilding industry vs. China and the issue of port tariffs. [online] Maritime-economies.eu. Available at: https://www.maritime-economies.eu/index.php/shipping/22-special-editions/3170-the-u-s-shipbuilding-industry-vs-china-and-the-issue-of-port-tariffs.

Paul, S.N. (2024). Oral testimony of Scott N. Paul, President, Alliance for American Manufacturing, before the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, 26 June. Available at: https://www.americanmanufacturing.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Oral-Testimony-of-Scott-N.-Paul-President-Before-House-Select-Committee-on-the-CCP-on-6.26.24-1.pdf.

Peterson Foundation (2024). Budget Basics: National Defense. [online] Peterson Foundation. Available at: https://www.pgpf.org/article/budget-explainer-national-defense/.

U.S. Trade Representative (2025). Report on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance. USTR. Available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf.

That thin, reedy, electric buzzing, it’s the sound of the modern war. It’s a sound that has replaced the deep, episodic violence of artillery with a continuous, ambient threat. Across Ukraine, Gaza, and every contested environment today, this acoustic signature signals a chilling, profound shift: the battlespace has moved into the mind. The tyranny of the small machine recasts human experience of conflict, turning war into a persistent psychological siege.

Drone warfare is a war of cheap machines and expensive consequences. Inexpensive, commercially available systems now impose a profound cognitive and emotional burden on both combatants and civilians. The persistent hum of drones overhead is more than background sound. It is the sonic trace of a century long trajectory that has brought warfare ever closer to the individual, making exposure continuous and pressure inescapable.

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The Five Ps: An Architecture of Psychological Warfare

The current drone phenomenon didn’t just appear overnight; it’s the endpoint of a steady evolution. This journey is best described through the Five Ps, the integrated shifts that have created this new architecture for psychological warfare.

1. Precision: It began with Precision, tracing a line from the early radio-guided ordnance of the Second World War (like the Fritz-X glide bomb) to the laser-guided bombs of Vietnam. This established the capability to guide munitions beyond brute force, laying the technical foundation for the targeted strike.

2. Persistence: This evolved into Persistence - the capacity for continuous surveillance using satellites and loitering platforms. Once precision became digital, it required a constant data feed, enforcing a state of continuous threat appraisal on the watched population, directly feeding hypervigilance.

3. Personalisation: This combination then led to Personalisation, famously institutionalised with the armed Predator drone post-9/11. Here, persistent surveillance fused with strike capability to focus war on the individual, using ‘pattern-of-life’ analysis to turn people into data profiles. It was politically neat, a ‘dream scenario’ of high value targeting without friendly casualties, but it created an intensely intimate form of remote killing.

4. Proliferation: The final two Ps converged powerfully in conflicts like Ukraine. Proliferation marked the shift from expensive, elite military systems to cheap, widely available First-Person-View (FPV) drones. Suddenly, commercial racing drones were weaponised, guided by operators in simple visors. This movement of aerial threat from strategic infrastructure to the individual human target democratised air power, creating the ‘Poor Man’s Air Force’ and accelerating the pace of innovation on the front lines.

5. Publicity: Finally, Publicity weaponised visibility. The intimate, visceral footage of a strike streams live to platforms like Telegram and YouTube, turning each act of war into a spectacle that is both propaganda and trauma. What once stayed secret now circulates, ensuring that the psychological damage is neurologically sustained long after the physical threat has passed.

German “Fritz X” Guided Bomb in the National Museum of the United States Airforce (2025).

The convergence of these Five Ps creates a battlespace specifically designed for strategic psychological attrition.

The Psychological Burden: Chronic Fear and Moral Injury

The technological convergence of the Five Ps creates two distinct, yet equally devastating, psychological outcomes on civilians and combatants alike, imposing a differentiated psychological burden. The following sections outline these effects.

However, due to the lack of data from active battlefields, we are left piecing together fragments from reports by journalists and human-rights investigators that sketch a picture both anecdotal and alarmingly consistent. This empirical vacuum is not accidental; the “fog of war” shields militaries from releasing data that could both call the ethics of these weapons into question and make recruiting new operators challenging, a fatal operational hazard amid combat.

The Civilian Experience: Ambient Threat and CPTSD

For the civilian population, the psychological cost is profound and chronic, stemming directly from the force of Persistence. Their experience is no longer one of episodic danger, but of ambient threat. The drone’s hum is a conditioned cue, a “sound of death,” that eliminates the concept of a safe interval or a secure domestic space. This continuous monitoring locks the brain’s fear circuitry into a state of chronic hypervigilance. Accounts from conflict zones show this relentless exposure - fear coupled with helplessness - aligns with the diagnostic criteria for Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD).

Moreover, the drone is actively leveraged for Psychological Operations (PsyOps), with reports detailing its use to broadcast screams and distress sounds over civilian areas. Worse, a torrent of cheap one-way attack drones hit civilian infrastructure like power grids and hospitals, directly attacking the population’s capacity for rest and recovery. This constant psychological drain makes populations vulnerable and undermines their resilience.

The Operator’s Burden: Intimacy and Moral Injury

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European defence is routinely described in terms that suggest looming peril.

According to one camp, Europe is hopelessly dependent on outside help and lacks the resolve to protect itself. According to another, Russia’s forces could steamroll half the continent before lunch. Both narratives are misleading. Europe does face steep challenges, yet its capabilities, industrial base and strategic advantages are far greater than the caricatures suggest.

Europe’s strengths exist, but they remain less visible, less promoted, and less understood, and that is largely Europe’s own fault. When the EU absorbs punitive trade terms, tariffs, and other slights from Washington, all under the banner of “keeping the U.S. onside,” even though Trump often seems closer to Putin than to Brussels, it is clear why many assume the continent lacks meaningful defences.

To better understand Europe’s defence capabilities, we felt it prudent to cover six common myths about European defence that deserve reconsideration.

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Myth 1: Europe Lacks Hard Power

Europe is often accused of lacking real hard power, but the numbers and recent commitments tell a far more encouraging story. Taken together, EU member states already spend about €343 billion a year on defence, and the inclusion of the United Kingdom pushes the total significantly higher. This spending is increasingly backed by firm pledges to expand defence industries, modernise forces, and accelerate joint procurement, all of which amplify the value of Europe’s investments in ways that simple comparisons often miss.

Though slow to get moving, Europe’s ambition is now set even higher. The EU’s €800 billion defence pledge, allocated over a defined period, signals a genuine intent to convert economic weight into strategic capability. At the same time, Russia’s wartime defence outlay has risen sharply and by 2024 was broadly comparable with, or in some assessments higher than, the combined EU and UK total when adjusted for purchasing power. This comparison hides a crucial fact: Europe commands a far larger economic base, deeper technological capacity, and a far more advanced industrial ecosystem, all of which support its ability to sustain and expand military power over time.

Europe’s air forces field one of the world’s largest concentrations of modern combat aircraft outside the United States. High-end estimates suggest Europe operates around 1,700 combat aircraft in total, of which 800–1,000 can be considered modern 4th and 5th generation platforms. This rises to 1,400-1600 in ordered numbers. This includes over 600 Eurofighter Typhoons delivered to European operators, substantial fleets of Rafales and Gripens, and a rapidly expanding inventory of F-35s across multiple nations. The UK alone contributes a significant several-hundred-strong modern fleet, centred on its Typhoons and 135 ordered/delivered F-35B fleet. Norway, a small European nation (by population), boasts an incredible 52 strong F-35 fleet on its own. It is clear then that Europe maintains a robust, diverse, and increasingly advanced air-power portfolio.

F-35s flying in Norwegian airspace. Source: Norwegian Armed Forces (2020).

Russia, meanwhile, fields a large air force comprising both older and modernised aircraft. Although the numbers are incredibly difficult to work out - given Russian lies and the difficulty in assessing losses in Ukraine - the numbers are less than Europe’s. Russia’s operational Su-57 fifth generation fighters remain modest, and the total 4^th/5^th gen fighter fleet stands at around 650-850. Of these, it is highly unlikely any aircraft match the F-35’s capabilities.

These numbers also ignore geography. Russia is vast and the European front is just one area of security concern. Russia’s air force protects against Japan, who themselves have ordered 147 F-35 variants, as well as Canada who are looking to have around 80-100 4^th/5^th gen operational fighters. Europe on the other hand has just one objective: utilise all their airpower against Russia.

Yes, F-35s are produced by Lockheed Martin, a US company, so this seems to support US reliance. However, the project was cofounded by 5 other European nations (UK, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark), as well as Canada and Australia. The F-35 is very much a NATO jet, with 15% of the components being British alone.

Hard power exists in abundance. What limits its effect is fragmentation rather than insufficiency. Better integration of planning and procurement would magnify capabilities that already dwarf Russia’s in quality and depth.

Myth 2: Europe Cannot Defend Itself Without the United States

At its core, this myth relies on two assumptions:

1. Europe is powerless against Russia without American backing.

2. Europeans have no real desire to defend their own continent.

American support is unquestionably valuable. High-end systems provided by the United States, ranging from strategic airlift and ISR capabilities to advanced missile defence and fifth-generation aircraft production, remain central pillars of Europe’s current defence posture. Yet the belief that Europe is fundamentally incapable of self-defence misinterprets the underlying dynamics. The European Union and the United Kingdom together have a combined gross domestic product of over €17 trillion, while Russia’s economy sits around €1.5–1.8 trillion, depending on exchange rates. Europe’s economic base is therefore nine to ten times larger.

In global terms, Europe remains one of the world’s largest defence spenders, and with renewed political will, rising budgets, and accelerating technological advantages, it is increasingly well placed to convert that spending into substantial hard power.

Demographic Advantage

Demographics are also heavily tilted in Europe’s favour. Europe’s population, at roughly 450 million people, is more than 2.5x that of Russia. Its research output, industrial sophistication, and technological base all exceed Russia’s by similar magnitudes.

You often see counter arguments relating to a Gallup poll in 2024 reporting that 32 % of citizens in the European Union said they would be willing to fight for their country if war broke out. They will argue that Europeans don’t want to defend Europe, so why should the US? There are two core issues with this argument. Even at face value, this 32% equates to 144 million adults (not including the UK), almost the same as Russia’s entire population (146 million).

More importantly however, people are more willing to fight when danger is apparent, rendering these surveys pointless. A 2025 paper in the European Journal of International Security found that when there is a proximate or actual conflict nearby, willingness to fight rises. This is obvious, since countries most at risk of invasion (Baltics, Poland, Finland), or those who perceive a serious threat to their nation (UK) score between 40-70% in willingness to fight, versus the 16-25% results in Germany and 29-31% in Spain.

Nuclear Powers

Crucially, Europe contains two independent nuclear powers. France maintains around 290 nuclear warheads and the United Kingdom around 225.

A recurring misconception is that the UK requires American approval to use its Trident missiles. It does not. The warheads are British-designed, the submarines are British-crewed, the firing chain of command is entirely UK sovereign, and the government in London alone can authorise their use. While the UK uses U.S.-manufactured missile bodies and participates in joint maintenance and logistics arrangements, operational control is fully independent.

Together, France and the United Kingdom provide a strategic deterrent unmatched by any region other than the United States, Russia, and potentially China.

Myth 3: Russia Outclasses Europe in Conventional Arms

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Credit: Vertical Aerospace (2025).

Britain is standing on the brink of an aviation revival. This revival does not stem from an aerospace giant, but from Vertical Aerospace - a Bristol-based aviation company developing a revolutionary electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft (eVTOL), the VX4. Its emergence has reopened the possibility of Britain once again becoming a key player in the future of aviation, something that has eluded the nation for more than half a century. It also keeps Europe in the eVTOL race, after a series of insolvencies.

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The UK’s aviation story is crowded with renowned aircraft models that are synonymous with quality and, in many cases, have changed the course of history. Aircraft such as the Mosquito, the Meteor, the Comet, and the Harrier (Figure 1) have brought technological innovations that have pushed boundaries and paved the way for further progress. The UK has long been home to an array of cutting-edge aerospace and defence companies, such as Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems and de Havilland, whose engines and aircraft frames set new standards for performance, safety and engineering excellence. These aircraft, and the companies that built them, established a legacy of ingenuity that still influences civilian and military aviation today.

Yet British aviation prestige has waned significantly since its Cold War peak. Following the V-force bomber era, the sector entered a prolonged decline driven by chronic underinvestment, industrial consolidation, political apathy and competition from larger US and European manufacturers. Technically, Britain has not produced a major, independently developed aircraft since the Harrier’s introduction in 1969 − a machine defined by the very capability that makes today’s eVTOL revolution possible: vertical take-off and landing.

Now, more than 50 years later, Vertical Aerospace offers Britain a second chance to be a driving force on aviation’s world stage. eVTOLs represent the first new aircraft category in approximately 90 years − a level playing field in which new players have a chance to emerge. If the UK is to reassert itself as a world-leading aviation region, Vertical may well be the company to carry the torch – but only (and this is a big but) if it receives the political backing and financial support needed to do so. Other European eVTOLs have shown that this support is far from certain.

Figure 1. Ground-breaking aircraft from the golden age of British aviation. [Top left]: The Mosquito − nicknamed ‘The Wooden Wonder’, one of the fastest propeller planes of WW2. Military Aviation Museum, 2025. [Top right]: The Meteor − Britain’s first jet fighter and the Allies’ only operational WW2 jet. Jet Age Aircraft Museum, 2024. [Bottom right]: The Comet − the world’s first commercial jet airliner. DH Aircraft, 2024. [Bottom left]: The Harrier −the first operational VTOL jet aircraft. Brittanica, 2007.

The Slow Erosion of a Leading Aerospace Power

Britain’s aptitude within the aviation sector became apparent in the interwar years, with de Havilland’s DH.88 Comet winning the 1934 Great Air Race between East Anglia and Melbourne. Through WW2 and into the Cold War, British engineers produced numerous pioneering aircraft, some of the earliest jet engines, the first commercial jet airliner, and the Harrier, which demonstrated brand new aerodynamic possibilities. During this period, the UK stood alongside the United States as the world’s premier aviation innovator.

But by the mid-1960s, powerful forces began reshaping the industry. Compared to the US, which was booming economically, British aviation was beginning to suffer from chronic underinvestment. Paired with weakening political resolve, this led to the breakdown of key aircraft programmes, such as the supersonic tactical strike aircraft, the TSR-2. Each cancelled project ceded ground to the US and other growing innovators, with successive British governments failing to support long-term strategic thinking and necessary capital requirements to prevent further decline.

The next threat came from industrial fragmentation. During the 1960s and 70s, most of Britain’s major aircraft manufacturers were forced into consolidating, merging, or closing, with each of these narrowing the UK’s independent design capability. A notable example was Hawker-Siddeley Group, which merged Hawker, Gloster, and de Havilland − all companies with a track record of innovative engineering breakthroughs.

Meanwhile, global competition intensified. American giants like Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed captured market share with large-scale, commercially successful aircraft. European collaboration produced Airbus, a competitor that gradually absorbed much of the continent’s aerospace talent and capital.

By the late 20th century, Britain had shifted from being a designer of complete aircraft to being a world-class supplier of major components: engines from Rolls-Royce, wings from Airbus UK, advanced aviation systems from BAE. The UK remained essential to global aviation but had been relegated to a supplier of parts rather than a hub of aircraft innovation.

A half-century gap now separates the UK’s last independently designed aircraft from its current capabilities. But this gap could be closed. Vertical Aerospace offers a long-awaited remedy − a chance to restore British aviation prestige and be at the forefront of a new, green solution for short-range aviation.

Vertical Aerospace – Europe’s Only Serious eVTOL Contender

Founded in 2016, Vertical Aerospace has rapidly emerged as Europe’s most credible eVTOL manufacturer and one of the few global companies positioned to certify an electric aircraft for commercial operation.

Vertical has pursued a deliberately conservative, certification-oriented design philosophy, opting for a simplified lift-plus-cruise architecture with only the forward rotors tilting for cruise flight. This is mechanically simpler than both Archer and Joby’s systems, which either have more rotors (Archer) or have full-tilt operation across all rotors (Joby). Whilst competitors have clearly certifiable pathways, Vertical is pursuing a design plan that priorities reliability, regulatory familiarity and ease of maintenance.

This commitment to reliability is reinforced through Vertical’s partnerships with prestigious aerospace suppliers. Honeywell provides avionics and flight controls, Leonardo develops the composite fuselage, Rolls-Royce contributes propulsion technology, and GKN Aerospace brings deep experience across much of the design/manufacturing process. These partners give Vertical a high level of engineering expertise and maturity that is rarely seen in an aviation company below a decade old.

Crucially, major airlines have selected the VX4 as their preferred eVTOL platform, giving Vertical one of the strongest commercial pipelines in the sector. Customers include American Airlines, Japan Airlines, AirAsia, and leasing groups such as Avalon and Azure, representing around 1500 provisional orders. While these orders remain subject to certification and operational milestones, airlines are traditionally cautious and do not lightly attach their brands to emerging aircraft programmes. This large-scale interest reflects confidence in Vertical’s certifiable eVTOL design and industrial strategy.

There have been other eVTOL startups in Europe − most notably Lilium and Volocopter, both of which were German-based companies. But these were let down by a risk averse government, which failed to secure a €50 million loan guarantee in the case of Lilium and also failed to rescue Volocopter from filing for insolvency. Due to this lack of political will, Vertical Aerospace is now Europe’s only serious eVTOL OEM on a credible path to certification. With US pioneers Joby and Archer − as well as fast moving Chinese companies − targeting early eVTOL dominance, Europe faces a strategic imperative to secure influence in this new aviation age. However, for Europe, this new age is currently reliant on the execution of a young, innovative British company.

Flight Progress - Vertical’s VX4

Central to Vertical’s strategy is its flagship aircraft, the VX4: a four-passenger eVTOL[1] designed for quiet, safe regional travel, with zero operational emissions (Figure 2). The VX4 has a current range of about 100 miles, can cruise at a speed of 150 mph, and greatly reduces noise in comparison to loud, impractical helicopters. Its acoustic profile makes it imperceptible among an ambient urban environment, even during take-off and landing. Although somewhat in the shadows of its louder US counterparts, Vertical is designing the VX4 with the ambition of creating the best-in-class aircraft in terms of safety, capacity, and comfort.

Vertical has made great strides in regulatory progress, working closely with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), two of the world’s most respected and stringent regulators. From September 2024 and throughout 2025, Vertical has completed phases 1-3 of the VX4 prototype flight test programme. This has included stabilised hover testing, vertical take-off and landing, slow speed manoeuvres, and conventional take-off and landing.

Phase 4 of the flight testing − piloted transition flight − is the final stage and is targeted for completion by the end of 2025. This will showcase the key innovation of eVTOL technology, demonstrating seamless transition between vertical movement and forward thrust. In order to achieve this, Vertical’s engineering and test teams have completed extensive simulation, ground, and flight testing in collaboration with the UK CAA to verify all 200 Minimum Safe Aircraft requirements.

Vertical has also been developing its manufacturing ecosystem, leveraging Britain’s existing supply chain in Bristol, the Midlands, and Northern Ireland − regions that already support Airbus, Rolls-Royce, and other major defence contractors. Together, technology validation, key regulatory progress, and supply-chain readiness signal that the VX4 is on-track towards successful navigation of the strictest aviation regulatory frameworks in the world. If Britain is to return to the forefront of global aviation, the VX4 would be the first aircraft to propel it into a new era.

Figure 2. Vertical’s VX4 eVTOL. AIN Media Group, 2024.

The Strategic Stakes

The stakes for Britain are significant, yet most people in the country and around the world remain unaware of how quickly the eVTOL sector is emerging. eVTOLs represent the first entirely new category of aircraft since helicopters were introduced in the 1930s. The nation that establishes leadership now will shape global standards, influence future regulation, and secure a critical early position in the urban air mobility (UAM) sector, which Morgan Stanley estimates could reach $1 trillion by 2040 and $9 trillion by 2050.

If Britain succeeds in backing Vertical Aerospace to certification and commercialisation, the national rewards could be extraordinary:

• Sovereign aircraft capability restored for the first time in over 50 years.

• Thousands of high-value engineering jobs retained, created, and expanded.

• Global influence over emerging eVTOL airspace standards.

• The UK positioned as a leading hub in sustainable aviation technologies.

But failure carries equally large consequences. If Vertical falters due to insufficient financial, political, or infrastructural support, the UK risks permanently losing the eVTOL race to the US and China. Britain would again become a component supplier to foreign-designed aircraft, mirroring the decades-long loss of autonomy after the long-term failures of the Comet and TSR-2 over 50 years ago. Loss of influence here could also have a cascading effect, leading to a diminished role in other key geopolitical sectors such as drones, AI, and critical minerals.

For Britain, this can be described as a once-in-a-generation aerospace opportunity. The decisions made in the next few years will determine whether Britain shapes the future of flight or merely participates again as a bystander.

Reclaiming a Seat at the Table

Vertical Aerospace provides Britain with something that has been lacking for decades: a clear pathway back into aircraft design leadership. This is not just about backing British technological innovation. It is about reawakening a national identity that is rooted in engineering excellence, scientific ambition, and the courage to build world-changing machines. Supporting Vertical means more than simply championing a home-grown company. It means backing a new, innovative industry that could redefine regional travel, reduce emissions, broaden capability in both civilian and defence operations, and establish the next era of British aerospace.

Back in the golden age of British Aviation, the nation astonished the world with aircraft like the Comet and the Harrier. It now stands before the possibility of a new golden age. If Britain acts with boldness, the VX4 could become the first major, independently British-designed aircraft to take to the skies in over half a century − a symbol not of a prestigious heritage, but of one that can be expanded further.

Vertical Aerospace has given Britain the opportunity to return to the forefront of aviation innovation. Now it is up to the country’s leadership to seize the opportunity − the future of British flight, and European eVTOL leadership, depends on it.

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[1] May have the future option to add another seat in the pilot cabin. Vertical is set to formally announce a larger capacity aircraft model on December 10th, 2025

References

Alcock, C. (2024) Vertical’s Second VX4 eVTOL Aircraft Almost Assembled for Flight Testing. AIN Media Group. Available at: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/futureflight/2024-03-15/verticals-second-vx4-evtol-aircraft-almost-assembled-flight

The Faraday Institution (2025) Qdot. Available at: https://www.faraday.ac.uk/success-stories/qdot/

GKN Aerospace (2025) GKN Aerospace and Partners Successfully Complete ASCEND Programme, Transforming High-Rate Composite Manufacturing. Available at: https://www.gknaerospace.com/news-insights/news/gkn-aerospace-and-partners-successfully-complete-ascend-programme-transforming-high-rate-composite-manufacturing/

Mentink, G. J. (2019) The great air race to Melbourne. AirHistory.net. Available at: https://www.airhistory.net/text/2019-09/macrobertson-melbourne-air-race-1934.php

Montagu-Pollock, G. (2024) Comet 2. DH Aircraft. Available at: https://www.dh-aircraft.co.uk/aircraft/dh106/comet2/

Vertical Aerospace (2025) Meet the VX4. Available at: https://vertical-aerospace.com/meet-the-vx4/

Vertical Aerospace (2025) News. Available at: https://investor.vertical-aerospace.com/news/default.aspx

Drone incursions into European airspace have surged in recent months as part of an escalating pattern of hybrid warfare by Russia, designed to destabilise Europe and undermine the collective response of NATO and the European Union (EU). On September 9-10, 19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, prompting a NATO air defence response, that included Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s. A few days later, on September 13^th, 3 Russian MiG-31 jets violated Estonian airspace for over 10 minutes, and drone flights were reported near military complexes in Estonia shortly after.

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Then towards the end of September and early October a series of drone related incidents impacted Danish, Norwegian, and German airports and military bases, with flights and airspace disrupted. These incursions have occurred across central, northern, and Eastern European states, with other notable drone incursions reported in other Baltic states, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, and France.

In response to these drone incursions, European leaders, have among other things endorsed the idea of a “drone wall” along Europe’s eastern flank. While not exactly defined, the drone wall is envisaged to be an integrated system of upgraded sensors, radars and interceptors spanning multiple territories on Europe’s eastern flank, to more reliably and cost effectively counter Russian airspace incursions and deter future Russian aggression. In the €800 billion ReArm Europe and €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiatives the EU has explicitly prioritised drones and counter-drone capabilities – so funding may be drawn from here or be in addition to it for the drone wall. However, as I will argue, by focusing resources and attention on the eastern flank, Europe might be underestimating the threat posed by internally launched drones and under resourcing its counter. I will not get into arguments around the effectiveness of the drone wall as a deterrence against Russian aggression in this article (see our piece “The Drone Frenzy”) but suffice to say that long-range strike capabilities offer the best deterrent.

Current law enforcement spending, counter-drone sophistication, and legislative support are not sufficient to tackle this emerging domestic drone threat. There is currently not a fully harmonised European-wide framework for dealing with drone incursions, although initiatives are quickly advancing. Counter-drone measures have largely been left to the individual member states, creating divergent technical capabilities, and differing legal authorities.

Prior to the recent drone incursions only a few states, most notably France, Britain and Romania, explicitly allowed security forces to shoot down unauthorised drones. Authorities in Denmark, Norway, and Germany did not have clear legal authority to intercept or shoot down unauthorised drones; and still many European states don’t (i.e. Norway). Funding for the drone wall should not come at the expense of increased funding for nation-state law enforcements and should not draw attention away from initiatives to harmonise and improve legal powers to counter unauthorised drones across Europe.

The Eastern Flank Drone Wall

F-35 Lightning 2. Source: Shutterstock.

Recent airspace incursions across Europe involving Russian drones and aircraft have prompted European leaders to reflect on the cost effectiveness of current air defence systems. Traditional air defence systems designed for aircraft and missiles, like the surface-to-air Patriot missile system or air-to-air F-35’s, are not cost effective solutions to shoot down drones. A Patriot PAC-3 missile can cost between $3-4 million per shot, while the missiles used by F-35’s range from $400,000 - $2,000,000 depending on the type used. With drones sometimes costing as little as a few thousand, this leads to a significant cost asymmetry, which is unsustainable in a prolonger peer-to-peer conflict or hybrid war. In addition to this legacy soviet-system radars, which likely account for a high amount of the radars in use in Eastern Europe, were designed for aircraft and missiles, and can be unreliable with small, slow-moving drones.

In response, European leaders have been quick to back the idea of a drone wall on Europe’s eastern flank – coming weeks after NATO launched its “Eastern Sentry” initiative to reinforce the same flank. While little information has been released on it, including timelines, costs and how it would operate with NATO’s initiative, what is imagined is an integrated web of upgraded sensors, modern radars and interceptors designed to reliably and more cost effectively detect, track and intercept drones spanning multiple countries in Eastern Europe.

The idea is to achieve interoperability among these states, which due to the scale of the anticipated cross-border infrastructure required needs EU-level co-financing. Estimates for costs vary from €3-7 billion to setup the infrastructure (not including interceptor costs), and timelines for it to be operational from 1-4 years. It would be a sort of modern day Maginot line (a comparison rejected by EU Commissioner Andrius Kubilius), created to more cost effectively protect key regions in Eastern Europe from Russian drone incursions and deter Russian aggression. Funds for this could come from the EU’s SAFE initiative, or by utilising immobilised Russian assets as EU Commissioner Kubilius has recently suggested.

The drone wall comes as the EU, NATO and European states have already significantly increased investments in military counter-drone solutions. The EU with its €800 billion ReArm Europe initiative, of which the €150 billion SAFE initiative is a part, explicitly prioritises drones and counter-drone capabilities as one of its key pillars. While NATO’s DIANA scheme (the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) is backed by €1 billion in funding and targets counter-drone technology as a key priority, among other things. European states, through national defence budgets, are also investing heavily in counter-drone solutions, with France recently ordering over $600 million (€517 million) in air defence and counter-drone systems.

Efficient Use of Resources?

Figure 1. Europe Anti-Drone Market Size and Trends. Source: Grand View Research (2025).

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Photo Credit: IAF

The High Price of Fighting the Last War

Politicians and defence firms across the West talk as if tomorrow’s wars will be drone wars. Defence spending is beginning to reflect this. But the truth is starker: the drone war isn’t coming, it’s here. Ukraine has proved both the power of drones and the speed with which countermeasures emerge, from electronic warfare to cheap kinetic interceptors. The age of uncontested drone dominance is already over; today’s battlefield is defined not by drones alone, but by the duel between them and the systems built to destroy them.

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I should make this clear from the outset: when I refer to drones here, I mean uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). I do not include hybrids, like the Anduril Barracuda 500 autonomous cruise missile. I also do not include uncrewed submersible/underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs), which have exciting prospects that have not been tested in the same manner as UAVs. History shows that failing to anticipate new technologies can be fatal. Overconfidence in fighting yesterday’s wars led to disasters. Russia’s overconfidence in their naval strength led to Russia’s humiliating defeat to Japan at Tsushima in 1905.

The lesson still holds. There is no mistake more costly than preparing to fight the last war.

That mistake echoes today. Russia’s enormous tank fleet - built to sweep through Europe in the Cold War - was unable to take Kyiv, repelled by handheld NLAWs, Bayraktar drones, and even grenades dropped from FPV drones. Iran’s “missile city” - cruise and long-range ballistic missiles - was rendered useless during Israel’s Operation Rising Lion. Their air defences were disabled not by a comparable force, but by small drones and smuggled components launched inside Iran, clearing the way for jets (including F-35s), to strike hard and precisely in a short time frame.

Stories like these create a seductive narrative: lumbering, expensive legacy systems outmanoeuvred by nimble, low-cost technology. It is a story investors cannot resist. Anduril, a defence start-up founded in 2017, has ridden this wave to a $30 billion private valuation, built largely on its portfolio of impressive autonomous systems such as the Bolt-M loitering drone, or the Ghost UAS. But there is a crucial caveat. These headline-grabbing successes have not taken place in true peer-to-peer conflict. They unfolded in one-sided engagements, against adversaries with patchy air defences and limited electronic warfare (at least in 2022 in Ukraine’s case) - not against states capable of deploying combined arms warfare from hundreds of miles away at land, air and sea.

Russia did what it has done time and again: underestimate its smaller adversary. The defining image of those first days remains the miles-long convoy of tanks jammed on narrow roads - a portrait of arrogance and poor planning. Moscow had absorbed little from decades of Western or Chinese doctrine on combined arms warfare. When the plan fell apart, the lack of coordination and communication turned a bold gamble into a grinding fiasco, culminating in abandoned hardware on the retreat from Kharkiv.

Iran, for its part, had not been tested by a serious opponent. Since the 1979 revolution, it has fought through proxies while over-investing in missiles – the only conceivable thing that could hit Israel at range - leaving glaring gaps in air defence and air power.

And here lies the danger: the more we shape our doctrine, budgets, and procurement around replicating the Ukrainian experience, the more we risk preparing for the wrong conflict. By anchoring strategy in one specific war, we risk blinding ourselves to radically different challenges, whether in the cramped geography of the Baltics or against a technologically sophisticated adversary - the Chinese elephant in the room.

In those settings drones will still matter, but will they be decisive?

Ask yourselves this: if the West ever finds itself relying on loitering munitions and FPV drones in the Baltics or Taiwan, what has gone terribly wrong? In a world of hypersonic missiles, stealth aircraft and AI-driven command systems, if you’re reaching for quadcopters and loitering drones, it is probably time to panic. Indeed, Russia’s increasing reliance on drones is not tactical genius; it is the measure of a force running out of better options.

Back to my point: over-investing in one technology, however fashionable, leaves dangerous vulnerabilities elsewhere. Just as Russia’s tanks and Iran’s missile fields proved brittle when confronted with adaptive opponents, the West could one day find that betting on drones as the centrepiece of future war leaves it dangerously exposed. None of this is to say drones are not incredibly useful and versatile. Like all military systems, drones come with both strengths and vulnerabilities. The current flood of new companies and political enthusiasm could give China and Russia exactly the opening they need to probe weaknesses in Western defence.

The Tank Obituary Was Premature

Not long ago, public figures like Elon Musk declared that the age of the tank was over. On paper, he had a point: tanks have looked increasingly vulnerable to drones and other anti-tank weapons. Yet, why then do commanders on the ground keep calling for as many as they can get? Despite their flaws, tanks remain the armoured spearhead of offensive operations - able to punch through defences, hold ground, and project intimidation in ways that drones, or light vehicles simply cannot. For all the talk of obsolescence, battlefield realities keep pulling tanks back to the front line. The tanks are vulnerable, it can take multiple well-aimed drones to destroy a tank, which is time a defender may not have in a combined arms armoured push.

The narrative is powerful - but also potentially misleading. There is a danger that policymakers, investors, and strategists over-interpret Ukraine, projecting its drone-heavy character onto conflicts where the context is radically different. Peer-to-peer wars, fought between states with advanced air defence, electronic warfare (EW), stealth, submarines, and long-range precision strike capabilities, are unlikely to be determined by UAVs.

Drones are tactically transformative but strategically constrained.

I will try to offer a reality check regarding the drone frenzy, by examining the strengths and limits of drones in peer warfare, contrasting Ukraine’s experience with what might unfold in the Baltics or Taiwan. I do not claim to predict the future of conflict, only to stress the enduring importance of strategic systems, alongside the need to keep funding and resources available for alternative approaches.

Ukraine: A Distorted Mirror of Modern War

Drones have become the emblem of modern warfare. From infrared footage of Bayraktars striking Russian convoys to viral clips of quadcopters dropping grenades into trenches, drones dominate not only tactical battlefields but also global imaginations of modern war. They symbolise asymmetry: the cheap defeating the costly.

Most (but not all) of this visibility stems from Ukraine, where drones appear omnipresent. Tactical quadcopters provide reconnaissance for artillery, larger UAVs conduct strikes, and loitering munitions disrupt infrastructure far from the front. Commentators have hailed drones as democratising airpower, empowering weaker actors and eroding the dominance of traditional systems.

The Ukraine war catapulted UAVs into the global spotlight. Early in the conflict, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones achieved successes, striking Russian convoys and air defence units. Their video footage provided a needed morale boost, demonstrating that Russia’s mechanised might could be punctured by inexpensive systems. As the war entrenched, Russia deployed Iranian Shahed-136 drones, loitering munitions that are proving disruptive, saturating Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Cheap to produce and difficult to intercept in large numbers, they forced Ukraine to expend costly air defence interceptors. Pilots have even sacrificed their lives in trying to intercept them.

The result is a battlespace where drones feel omnipresent, shaping tactical engagements and public narratives. For Western observers, the lesson has been that drones are the future of warfare. They are no doubt revolutionising certain aspects of war, but this lesson might be too hasty. Ukraine is an extremely unique case.

The first thing that must be dispelled is the notion that drones were the natural technological/warfare evolution in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

Speaking at the Victor Pinchuk Foundation event this September, Pavlo Palisa, Deputy Head to the Office of the President of Ukraine, stated that they had no choice but to create first person view (FPV) drone squads and drone bomber units. He went on to state that due to delivery delays from the West in 2023, his unit had run out of 155mm artillery shells near Bakhmut. Notice, he does not describe artillery as less effective, or tanks as irrelevant. The Ukrainians simply had no other alternatives. It was not just resource limitations; the West continues to constrict Ukrainian strategy with political limitations. Ukraine did not have the capability or permission to fire long range strikes into Russia. As of the time of writing, they continue to be denied deep strike capabilities by the US and Germany – arguably its most critical partners.

Necessity was the mother of the drone. Ukraine spent years developing its Flamingo long-range missile, yet FPV and loitering drones can be produced by the millions, built by thousands of dispersed suppliers. Russia, facing the unsustainable costs of its missile campaign, pivoted to cheap Iranian drones blended with domestic designs - timing major strikes to coincide with NATO meetings or Zelensky’s visits abroad, signalling to Washington that it still had leverage. On the ground, Russian commanders now send in motorcycles, not because tanks are obsolete, but because they lack the armour and air cover needed for armoured thrusts.

The second, more decisive factor lies in Ukraine’s unique battlespace conditions. A set of circumstances made drones unusually prominent:

• Permissive airspace: Neither side achieved air superiority, leaving room for drones to operate.

• Static frontlines: Entrenched positions made UAVs essential for surveillance and artillery correction.

• Open terrain: Steppe and farmland allowed unobstructed line-of-sight operations (see the Taiwan section).

Fragmented EW and IADS: Russian defences were present but uneven; Ukraine lacked comprehensive coverage.

Together, these conditions created an environment unusually favourable to drones. But that mix is unlikely to repeat itself in future peer-to-peer wars fought across contested, multi-domain battlespaces. Fixating on Ukraine risks blinding the West to how different a conflict would look in the Baltics or Taiwan – the two most plausible theatres of peer confrontation. You’ve probably seen the maps circulating on Substack accounts like Ukraine’s Arms Monitor: grim webs of Russian strike routes crisscrossing Ukrainian airspace. What they leave out, though, is Ukraine’s lack of both the permission and the capability to hit those launch sites at the source – let alone take the fight into Russia itself. NATO does not suffer from this problem. For all its glaring shortcomings in sustaining a long war, deep-strike and airpower are not among them. Therefore, a heavy focus on drones would be to allocate scarce resources towards a problem that may not exist in a peer-to-peer engagement.

Geography - Not Every Battlefield Is Built for Drones

Geography defines the role of drones. I hope to show you that this is even more true for the West’s most likely battlegrounds.

The Baltic States

The Baltics are simply too small and geographically constrained for a Ukraine-style drone war to dominate. Unlike Ukraine’s vast territory: wide frontlines, open farmland, and long sightlines allow UAVs to hover, scout, and cue artillery across a deep battlespace. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania together are less than a third the size of Ukraine, with no comparable depth. From almost anywhere on their territory, a drone would already be within range of layered air defences, electronic warfare, and counter-battery fire. There is no “rear area” for drones to loiter in safety.

The terrain compounds the problem. Unlike Ukraine’s plains, the Baltics are cut up by forests, lakes, and marshes. These features shorten lines of sight, mask movement, and funnel heavy vehicles into only a handful of predictable road and rail corridors. This geography inherently favours fast, concentrated manoeuvre - armoured thrusts through chokepoints to seize junctions, capitals, or the Suwałki Gap - over slow, attritional drone-artillery duels.

That is what makes the Baltic Defence Line - a system of anti-tank ditches, obstacles, and fortified positions due for completion in 2027 - so strategically important. By hardening the few obvious routes of advance, these states can block or at least slow Russian armour, turning restrictive geography into a defensive asset. Drones will still matter for spotting and harassment, but they are auxiliaries, not the main instrument of attack. In the Baltics, it is mobility, chokepoint control, and anti-mobility measures that buy NATO the time it needs to reinforce - making any invasion both more costly and less likely to succeed.

Taiwan

Taiwan is bad ground for drones. Geography alone breaks the Ukraine analogy. Start with the obvious: it’s an island. That fact alone wipes out most group/class 1 to 3 drones. Small quadcopters and medium UAVs that swarm across Ukrainian farmland simply can’t fly from the Chinese mainland and expect to matter in a rapid invasion force, beyond a smaller contingent of ship-launched drones. Only a handful of northern and southern beaches are even suitable for landings - making any invasion route narrow, obvious, and saturated with defences.

The valley of San Guang River, Fusing, Taoyuan, Taiwan.

And then you hit the mountains. Taiwan’s spine rises nearly 4,000 metres, cloaked in dense forests and carved by steep valleys. This isn’t the endless steppe. Here, trees and terrain mask targets, GPS signals degrade, comms drop out, and line-of-sight shrinks. Drones that hover freely over Donbas trench lines would be blind or deaf in Taiwan’s interior.

The tempo is different too. Ukraine’s drone war thrives on slow attrition, grinding artillery duels, and long, flat horizons. A Taiwan fight would be the opposite: compressed geography, rapid manoeuvre, and high intensity strikes under constant electronic warfare, radar coverage, and layered air defences. In that kind of battlespace, attrition by sheer numbers won’t work. You can’t flood the skies with disposable UAVs when every wave is shredded almost instantly.

The Ukrainian UAV model simply doesn’t transfer to East Asia. Small drones won’t loiter over Taiwanese brigades. Medium-altitude UAVs won’t survive layered SAM coverage. The tools that do matter here are different: submarines to strike surface vessels, long-range precision missiles to hit staging areas, stealth aircraft to punch through air defences etc. Drones may still have niche jobs - scouting an amphibious landing, probing gaps - but they won’t define the fight.

Countermeasure Evolution

I keep seeing the same argument repeated: we’re using F-35s to shoot down cheap drones, why is NATO so unprepared? There are valid concerns with Europe’s lack of air-to-air missile inventories and capabilities. However, the framing collapses when you stop thinking in peacetime optics and start thinking in scenarios. Yes, in peace it looks absurd to spend a very expensive missile to dispatch a cheap Gerber drone. The key word is peacetime.

Deploying dedicated counter-drone systems along NATO’s borders would itself be an escalation - no different in signalling terms than Germany sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine. The technology exists and is improving quickly, but the most cost-effective solutions, like Saab’s Loke, are little more (at least the kinetic part) than a light machine gun mounted on a 4×4. In wartime, that’s perfectly sensible, but I don’t know how Polish citizens would feel to see gunners posted on their street corners, or interceptor squads in their communities.

NATO is a defensive alliance built for deterrence. You do not deter an enemy force with anti-air systems; you deter them with more offensive capabilities than your opponent. Advertising an impeccable defensive line just invites enemies to think, “let’s test that theory”. The French learnt this with their Maginot Line in WW2, and Israel are still learning it. Advertising an Iron Dome is less of a psychological deterrent than they think. Accepting this reality could save the US a lot of money with their ‘Golden Dome’.

So yes, Russia could in theory breach NATO defences in certain areas with a large drone push, but Putin knows that the consequences would be to face over 1,000 ground attack aircraft, 3,000 fighter aircraft and over 10,000 other aircraft. There are expected to be 550 F-35 stealth aircraft variants in Europe by 2030. Norway alone has 52 F-35As. Decisive systems like these go a long way in preventing wars from starting - ending them swiftly if war is no longer avoidable.

Addressing Cost Asymmetry

Cost asymmetry has been the single greatest selling point of UAVs. Using an expensive Patriot system to knock down a one-way attack drone is a losing trade, and it has made headlines because it exposes a simple truth: hard-kill air defences were never built for swarms of low-cost craft. Yet every disruptive weapon breeds its counter. Directed energy, radio-frequency attack, jamming and low-cost interceptors are spreading fast, and they are designed to turn that unfavourable arithmetic on its head or at least bring it to manageable levels.

Loke with Giraffe 1X: Saab’s Loke concept pairs the Giraffe 1X short-range 3D radar with a modular effectors package to produce a rapid, mobile counter-UAV node. The radar is small, light and refreshes the air picture every second, which makes it excellent at cueing cameras, jammers and interceptors against low, slow targets. Loke’s virtue is integration: high tech sensors feeding cheap shooters, deployed in numbers so the defender forces the attacker to search for holes rather than targets. You can mount pretty much any machine gun to such a system, making the kinetic aspect of the system incredibly cheap. The relatively low cost Nimbrix missile has also been developed to work with the Loke system.

Complete system, including the Giraffe 1X (right), and vehicle with the trackfire remote weapon station mounted (left) (Saab, 2025).

Marder and airburst rounds: Legacy armour and autocannon can be adapted cheaply to provide effective hard kill. European systems such as Rheinmetall’s 35 mm AHEAD rounds and modern 30 mm programmable munitions create a dense cloud of sub-projectiles that shred small UAVs at close ranges. Germany is rolling ammunition and gun upgrades into mobile air defence like Skyranger and Gepard variants, and IFVs such as Marder 1A3 are being fielded alongside these systems.

DragonFire is the UK’s flagship laser demonstrator: Using a UK-developed beam-combining technique, it generates a high-power beam (reported to be in the ~50 kW class) and has successfully achieved high-power firings against aerial targets during trials. Lasers have extremely low marginal cost per engagement where power and weather permit, making them attractive for ships and fixed ground sites. Firing DragonFire for 10 seconds costs less than an hour of running a standard heater, with each shot costing under £10. Recent trials saw the weapon successfully fire at a target with such precision that was the equivalent of hitting a £1 coin from a kilometre away.

DragonFire System (Navy Lookout, 2025).

RapidDestroyer / RF directed energy: Thales and UK partners have tested a radiofrequency directed energy demonstrator in Wales that detected, tracked and neutralised large numbers of test drones in recent trials. RF DEWs operate by frying or disrupting electronics in bulk. They are line-of-sight and energy intensive, but they can be extremely cheap per engagement and scalable for convoy or base protection.

Interceptor drones and FPV hunters: Autonomous counter-UAVs such as Fortem’s DroneHunter F700 are designed to chase, net or otherwise intercept intruders. Meanwhile, high-speed FPV interceptors improvised in Ukraine show how low-tech, expendable drone hunters can be fielded fast. These systems neutralise targets either intact or by controlled crash, reducing collateral damage, compared with explosives.

The China Problem

For all their futuristic promise, drones are built on an uncomfortable material truth: much of the value in a modern UAV lies not in the airframe but in components and minerals that are concentrated in a single place. China supplies vast swathes of sensors, batteries and motors, and it dominates the processing and refining of key inputs such as rare earths, gallium and germanium. The numbers are staggering. The commercial drone market (responsible for FPV drones) is around 90% Chinese owned. That dependence runs right through the supply chain.

The result is strategic fragility; a single policy shift in Beijing can ripple quickly through prices, delivery times and industrial planning in the West.

Even sustaining large drone fleets is not simply a matter of assembly lines. Mass operations demand enormous, continuous industrial output and secure, resilient supply chains - precisely the things most vulnerable to export controls, sanctions and geopolitical disruption. Ukraine’s current UAV capability survives only because of foreign aid, imports and extraordinary improvisation. In a high intensity peer conflict, that external lifeline cannot be taken for granted. When upstream refining and component supply chains tighten, the production base for sensors and batteries shrinks, and fielded fleets age without reliable replenishment.

The market reaction is already visible. Where export rules tighten, deliveries slump and prices spike; infrared sensors and other niche parts have reportedly tripled in price in recent shortages, while lead times have lengthened. Defence firms and procurement authorities are now scrambling to diversify sources, substitute materials and build buffer stocks, but these are heavy, slow remedies. In short, the cutting edge of unmanned warfare rests on supply chains controlled by our greatest adversary. That strategic reality should temper any assumption that cheap drones are a permanent, unassailable advantage for the West.

The Perils of Strategic Myopia

The drone story is seductive because it reads like a solution: fewer casualties, cheaper kits, viral footage and quick wins. That is precisely the argument I opened with. Politicians and industry are pouring money into uncrewed systems because Ukraine makes the case look irrefutable. The UK is the most vivid example of this. The ‘40-40-20’ UK defence spending plan allocates 80% of funding to uncrewed systems. Defence start-ups sitting on headline valuations and pundits talking of a drone war economy also point towards a drone frenzy. At the same talk with Pavlo Palisa, the President of the Kiel Institute criticised Germany for only having 5% of new defence spending allocated to unmanned systems. Yes, 5% is obviously too low, but should it really be 80%? What happens when counter-autonomous systems are comparably cost effective? When autonomous systems are incapacitated, a battle will be determined by ‘legacy’ systems and the crews operating them.

Ukraine’s lessons are vital but limited: what proves effective in an attritional, defensive struggle against a larger adversary across vast, relatively flat terrain does not automatically translate to the NATO-backed Baltics or the Indo-Pacific. History shows that betting heavy on one assumption can prove fatal. Russia’s tank columns choked on narrow roads; Iran’s missile arsenals proved futile against stronger air power. If the West’s response is to channel four fifths of future investment into uncrewed systems, we risk replicating those mistakes: preparing to fight the last conflict rather than the next one.

Drones and uncrewed systems are important, and this importance will only grow with technological advancements. But they will not decide wars on their own - at least not in the next five critical years, with China preparing for conflict and Russian aircraft probing NATO territory almost daily. Drones are powerful force multipliers in certain contexts but liabilities in others. Policymakers should treat them as part of an orchestral score, not the conductor.

We must not mistake Russia’s desperation for strategic clarity. The backbone of deterrence still lies in decisive capabilities: submarines, long-range precision strike, advanced aircraft across roles, and AI-driven industrial and logistical resilience. These should command the bulk of funding. More so when most drone components are sourced from China. The central lesson from both Ukraine and Russia is clear: both countries rely on drones because they must, not because they should. We should not confuse necessity for strategy.

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References

Allison, G. (2025b) ‘British troops “shoot down” swarm of over 100 drones’, UK Defence Journal, 17 April. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-troops-shoot-down-swarm-of-over-100-drones/ (Accessed: 29 September 2025).

Defence Equipment & Support (Ministry of Defence) (no date) DragonFire: Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW). Available at: https://des.mod.uk/what-we-do/partnering-with-industry-case-studies/des-working-with-mission-partners-to-deliver-laser-directed-energy-weapon-for-the-royal-navy/ (Accessed: 29 September 2025).

Saab (2025) ‘From concept to impact - Saab and the Swedish Air Force Deploy “Loke”’, 17 March. Available at: https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2025/march/from-concept-to-impact---saab-and-the-swedish-air-force-deploy-loke (Accessed: 29 September 2025).

Salerno-Garthwaite, A. (2023) ‘Giraffe 1X radar from Saab to be sold to UK’, Army Technology, 3 May. Available at: https://www.army-technology.com/news/giraffe-1x-radar-from-saab-to-be-sold-to-uk/ (Accessed: 29 September 2025).

Photo Credit: Shutterstock

A transformational shift is underway in United States (US) drone policy, as sweeping actions from the White House, Congress and the Pentagon aim to supercharge the nation’s small drone industry. Driven by tactical lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War and increasing concerns about China’s supply chain dominance, the US is attempting to rapidly build a resilient domestic drone ecosystem as a matter of strategic autonomy.

In the space of five weeks, the US has:

• Signed two executive orders overhauling drone policy.

• Passed the legislative spending bill the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ (OBBB), with $13.5 billion earmarked for small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS).

• Issued a Pentagon directive that aims to put sUAS in the hands of every company and strips away procurement red tape.

A domestic drone ecosystem is being built at speed, with particular focus on building out sUAS capabilities to complement the US’s traditional focus on sophisticated medium to large unmanned aerial systems (UAS) like the Predator drones used in the Middle East. Unlike the medium to large US UAS market the sUAS market is not dominated by defence legacy primes and is instead populated by a number of smaller companies and startup innovators. With capital flooding into the sector, these companies have seen jumps in revenue, but while the rapid expansion holds vast opportunities for sUAS companies, the influx of capital and competitors could quickly test the market’s capacity.

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Why is the Policy Shift Happening?

sUAS Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War

The Russia-Ukraine War - which some have called the world’s first full-scale drone-centric war - has shown that drones are no longer tactical accessories but form a core pillar of national defence. Estimates from Ukrainian military officials suggests that 60-70% of all battlefield casualties are now caused by drones. Ukraine’s success in counteracting Russia’s advantages in manpower and firepower have in large part hinged on cheap, mass produced sUAS:

• First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones for one-way explosive strikes.

• Quadcopters and fixed-wing drones for surveillance and munitions drops.

• Loiter munitions, like AeroVironment’s Switchblade 600, blending drone flexibility with missile lethality for one-way strikes after loitering in a target area.

These forms of cheap sUAS, now manufactured in their millions by Ukraine and Russia have had a transformational impact on the War, reflecting a new form of asymmetric warfare. For the US, this has triggered a doctrinal rethink: alongside its traditional reliance on sophisticated medium and large UAS, like the MQ-9 Reaper, Washington now sees sUAS as critical for future conflict, especially in a peer-to-peer conflict.

China’s Commerical and Supply Chain Dominance

However, this pivot has also exposed a strategic vulnerability: China’s near monopoly on the global commercial drone market and supply chains. Chinese manufacturers, led by the world’s largest commercial drone manufacturer Shenzhen based DJI, control an estimated 77-85% of the US consumer drone market. They also dominate critical component production and materials in drone supply chains, such as rare-earth magnets, where China controls up to 90% of the world’s supply. This gives Beijing supply chain leverage, which they are utilising now amid trade tension.

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Europe’s Defence Awakening

After two years of painfully slow mobilisation following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s defence awakening is finally underway.

Germany: After the €100 billion Bundeswehr special fund, Berlin now plans a 46% increase to the core defence budget by 2028, keeping it on track for 3.5% of GDP. This trajectory, once unthinkable, is now credible.

France: Military spending will rise to €57.2 billion in 2026 and €63.4 billion in 2027 - a 25.5% increase over 2025 levels. But unlike Germany, these gains rely on politically risky cuts to pensions, healthcare, and social programmes. After 2027, growth flattens.

United Kingdom: With spending climbing toward £66 billion by 2028, Britain is on track to exceed 2.5% of GDP, with potential to push beyond 3% under recent NATO pledges. Defence enjoys broad political consensus, and London is positioning itself as Europe’s primary naval and expeditionary power.

For the first time in decades, Europe’s three largest defence economies are moving in the same direction. There is momentum, and a recognition that in a multipolar world, where neither superpower can be fully relied upon, Europe cannot afford to remain militarily fragmented. Still, these signals from Europe’s largest defence economies are encouraging. For the first time in decades, there’s momentum - and a recognition that Europe cannot afford to be militarily fragmented in a multipolar world in which for the first time since WW2, neither superpower can be trusted. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call.

Money Without Structure is Waste

Yes, defence budgets have risen across the continent. But money alone is meaningless without the industry, vision, and capabilities to make best use of it. Japan - making its first foreign warship sale since WWII - recently outbid Germany for the order of 11 frigates for Australia. The Australians cited quality, cost, and delivery time. Similarly, South Korean shipyards, because they specialise and build to scale, produce naval vessels more cheaply (especially in PPP terms) than their U.S. counterparts. The lesson is clear: specialise in what your country is best at, plan to build at scale to reduce cost, and ensure that your equipment is standardised, a non-issue for one nation, but vital for Europe and NATO.

Europe still lacks coordination. France, Germany, the UK (and potentially Italy) all continue to fund separate tank lines, naval platforms, and overlapping aircraft programmes, resulting in duplication, inefficiency, and an arsenal too disjointed to deter a peer adversary like Russia, let alone match the industrial tempo of the US or China. Ukraine has already paid the price for this fragmentation, forced to operate a patchwork of armoured vehicles from different donors, each with its own training requirements, spare parts, and maintenance infrastructure. British Challengers and German Leopards, delivered in small batches, had to be deployed cautiously. Their limited numbers—a product of low production rates - meant they could never be supplied in decisive quantities, and the months-long delays between announcements and arrivals gave Russia ample time to adapt and prepare countermeasures.

Fast forward to Ukraine’s battlefields: Leopard 2s may be superior to T-72s and even T-90s, but when supplied in only double digits they face the same fate as the WWII Tiger tanks -outnumbered, forced into defensive roles, and unable to shape the war decisively. Ukraine has leaned heavily on more readily available infantry fighting vehicles like the U.S. Bradley, with combat footage even showing a Bradley taking on Russia’s more modern T-90s. The battlefield is making the point bluntly: in modern industrial warfare, victory goes to those who can build and replace quickly, not simply

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A downed drone. Source: Saab (2025).

With the transformational rise of drone technology in modern warfare, agile and cost-effective Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) have become an urgent priority. The Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted that cheap drones present an asymmetrical threat and using expensive traditional air defence systems is an unsustainable broken cost equation.

Western militaries face an urgent need to accelerate innovation, and Sweden is emerging as a frontrunner through close collaboration with its defence industry - particularly the Swedish company Saab. In a remarkable display of rapid collaboration rarely seen in modern military contexts, the Swedish Air Force, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), Saab, and several partners successfully evaluated Concept "Loke" in just 84 days.

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Loke

Complete system, including the Giraffe 1X (right), and vehicle with the trackfire remote weapon station mounted (left), Source: Saab (2025).

Loke is a Swedish C-UAS system aimed at addressing the broken cost equation of modern drone warfare. It is a modular and mobile system, rapidly developed by repurposing existing technologies. It comprises Saab’s Giraffe 1X radar for detection and classification, a lightweight command and control based on short-range air defence (SHORAD) principles, and Saab’s Trackfire Remote Weapon Station (RWS) - commonly found on naval vessels such as the Combat Boat 90. This cutting-edge system represents a major step-forward in counter-drone technology, combining detection and neutralisation systems to address the rapidly escalating threat posed by hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a cost-effective manner.

Saab’s Giraffe 1X Radar

Giraffe 1X surveillance system. Source: Saab (2025).

Loke utilises Saab’s Giraffe 1X, which is a lightweight 3D active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar first introduced in 2016. It is designed for very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) and can be used as a gap filler to complement larger Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems. It is a portable system, weighing less than 150kg and can be mounted on vehicles, buildings, or operated as a standalone man-portable unit. Importantly it delivers an instrumented range of up to 75km, 360° coverage and the ability to detect and track numerous targets simultaneously – including small, low and slow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

As demand is growing for C-UAS systems, various NATO members and Western partners are turning to the Giraffe 1X as a complement to their existing GBAD systems. Latvia was the launch export customer in December 2022, and in 2023 the UK put in an order for 11 Giraffe 1X units, valued at approximately $25 million (≈£19m), for integration into its Sky Sabre system. The UK does not field the US Patriot system, instead the current backbone of its GBAD is the Sky Sabre system, focused on short-to-medium range protection. The Giraffe 1X radars give improved capabilities for VSHORAD, which is needed to counter the drone threat. In 2024 Sweden put in a large-scale order, valued at SEK 700 million (≈£54m), for integration into its GBAD solution. On the back of this Saab made the unusual decision in February 2025 to double its Giraffe 1X production capacity, in anticipation of increased demand.

Meanwhile, the radar is gaining battlefield experience in Ukraine, where it is currently deployed to bolster local air defences. It’s portability, optimisation for VSHORAD and now combat-proven performance make it particularly well-suited for C-UAS. Though expensive, the inclusion of the Giraffe 1X marks Loke as a technologically sophisticated and strategically valuable development in drone defence.

Saab’s Trackfire Remote Weapon Station

Trackfire Remote Weapon Station. Source: Saab (2025)

The asymmetric advantage of cheap drones means that while surveillance systems like the Giraffe are always necessary, expensive GBAD missiles are not a viable solution. Enter the Loke Trackfire system. Saab’s Trackfire RWS serves as the engagement mechanism of the Loke system, offering precise, remotely operated firepower from a stabilised platform. The system is not the weapon itself, which can be a variety of heavy machine guns and other weapons – ammunition for such weapons being relatively cheap. This cheap firing mechanism is what helps to make Loke cost-effective.

Trackfire features fully stabilised pan-and-tilt operation, enabling accurate targeting and engagement of aerial threats, such as UAVs, even while on the move. It boasts an advanced sensor suit of a camera, thermal imager and laser rangefinder delivering round-the-clock targeting and situational awareness. It is installed on various military platforms, including naval vessels like the Combat Boat 90, and target and sensor data can be shared across platforms or transmitted within a single vehicle or vessel. As part of the Loke system, it interfaces directly with the Giraffe 1X radar and a SHORAD command-and-control system, forming part of the entire kill chain capable of detection, identification and immediate response. The Trackfire RWS forms a crucial part of the Loke system, enabling drones to be eliminated in a cost-effective manner.

A New Age of Warfare, Defined by Cost and Creativity

Through Project Loke, Sweden is at the forefront of developing innovative and cost-effective C-UAS solutions. The country was well-positioned for this breakthrough, as Saab is one of the global leaders in relatively affordable radar technology (like the Saab GlobalEye aircraft). By rapidly repurposing existing, proven technologies, Sweden was able to drastically shorten the research and development cycle, demonstrating what is possible when innovation is aligned with urgency.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine has exposed the destructive potential of low-cost drones and revealed the limitations of traditional air defence systems in countering this evolving threat. In response, systems like Loke are urgently needed to strengthen Western air defences against this new asymmetric form of aerial ‘swarming’ warfare.

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Introduction

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sea mine capabilities – largely untested since the Cold War - have been on full display, effectively thwarting amphibious assaults and inflicting damage on enemy vessels. For decades, Western navies have focused primarily on mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities, as seaborne territorial threats remained minimal. In the post-Cold War era, sea mine inventories and capabilities dwindled as attention shifted from peer-to-peer conflict to counterinsurgency.

Having spent the past two decades focused primarily on counterinsurgency, the West now finds itself unprepared for the resurgence of great power competition. As geopolitical tensions escalate - particularly in strategically vital regions such as the Indo-Pacific - peer-to-peer conflict is once again a central concern. In response, forward-positioned nations like Taiwan, Australia, Denmark, and others are rapidly renewing their investment in naval mine warfare, recognising its critical role in modern deterrence and sea control. The US, too, has begun developing a new generation of stealthy sea mines to be deployed by Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). Modern sea mine technology, equipped with advanced sensors, embedded algorithms and decision-making systems, has progressed beyond the crude devices of decades past;. This evolution is part of a broader shift in naval warfare toward an unmanned technology-driven future. But, despite advances in sea mine technology, it has been argued that cheap traditional sea mines will still play a useful role alongside more expensive, sophisticated modern sea mines in future naval warfare.

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Sea Mine Atrophy in the West post-Cold War

For Western nations territorial threats from the sea diminished in the post-Cold War environment. Consequently, naval mine stockpiles and capabilities have declined over the past decades as investment has dwindled. Strategy moved to focusing on countering adversaries’ use of naval mines through mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities. With the retirement of the Mark 60 CAPTOR mines in 2001, the US only has the MK67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) - in service since 1979 – and the Quickstrike family of mines (in service since 1983), the MK 62, MK 63 and MK 65, in operation. The UK Royal Navy has only one operational sea mine, the Stonefish, which has been in service since the 1970s. It’s a similar story for most Western nations, with the sea mines in operational use today entering service in the 1980s.

As well as a lack of technological progress in the sea mines in active use, inventories have been declining since the end of the Cold War in Western nations. The US is estimated to have fewer than 10,000 sea mines, while European NATO navies have only modest stockpiles, ranging from the low thousands to just a few hundred for some countries (by comparison, Russia is estimated to have 250,000 sea mines and China between 50,000 – 100,000). Western nations switched to counter-insurgency warfare during the peace dividend years and consequently sea mine inventories and capabilities atrophied. But, numbers are crucial when it comes to effective area denial, and as evidenced by Ukrainian successes against Russia in the Black Sea, sea mines remain a useful tool in modern naval conflicts.

Revival in Sea Mine Inventories and Investment in Sea Mines

Given a resurgence in peer-to-peer conflict risks in the hotspots of the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan, there has been a renewal of interest and funding in sea mine capabilities. In April 2025 Taiwan announced they are to more than double their minelayer fleet with an additional six vessels to be completed by the end of 2026. Australia, under Project SEA 2000 Maritime Mining, is accelerating the development of advanced naval mine capabilities. In 2023, it signed a contract worth several hundred million euros with RWM Italia, a division of Rheinmetall, for the delivery of smart sea mines. Marking a significant shift in operational readiness, the Royal Australian Navy laid sea mines during a 2024 training exercise, the first such deployment in nearly fifty years.

Figure 1. Two images showing the Baltic Sea depth levels (left) and marine traffic (right).

Australia is not alone in recalibrating its naval posture. In July 2024, Germany and eight other Baltic Sea nations - including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden - launched a joint initiative to purchase sea mines. The move is aimed at reinforcing control over critical maritime chokepoints and deterring potential Russian aggression in the region. The image on the left of Figure 1 shows the different depth levels in Baltic Sea, which has an average depth of 54 meters, and at its deepest reaches approximately 489 meters. As such the geography of the Baltic Sea particularly lends itself to the effective use of sea mines, which tend to have effective operating ranges of between 0 to 300 meters depending on the mine. However, the issue is the Baltic Sea is busy with commercial vessels, as shown in the image on the right of Figure 1. In this scenario sophisticated sea mines thus make sense, as their technology allows the mines to differentiate between vessels, thus reducing collateral damage. This helps to explain why in March 2025, Denmark are suspected to have purchased the Finnish company FORCIT Defence’s Blocker sea mines – a modern smart influence sea mine - when they announced they would acquire several hundred additional sea mines, citing heightened concerns over regional security and increased Russian naval activity in the Baltic.

Sea Mines and the United States

In the US the focus recently has been on developing clandestinely (deployed in secret) launched sea mines, primarily from UUVs. The Hammerhead mine has been developed as a direct successor to the Cold War-ear Mark 60 CAPTOR mine and is a new-generation, moored, encapsulated anti-submarine system produced by General Dynamics Mission Systems. It is designed to be clandestinely deployed by UUVs; it anchors to the seabed and uses advanced autonomous sensors to detect, classify and confirm enemy submarine signatures before launching a Mark 54 lightweight torpedo at the target. At an estimated cost per unit of $1.2 million, the Hammerhead sea mine is far more expensive than traditional sea mines but is less than one-third the cost of a Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (estimated unit cost of $3.3 million). At a rate of three Hammerhead mines delivered per month, the inventory build-up is slow and so would be of limited use currently should the US need to deploy sea mines in the Indo-Pacific.

Other key developments in the US are the development of the Clandestine Delivered Mine (CDM) and the MEDUSA (Mining Expendable Delivery Unmanned Submarine Asset) program. Little is known about the CDM, but it has been suggested that it is a standard bottom mine to be deployed on the Orca extra-large UUV (XL-UUV). Whereas the MEDUSA program is currently in the research, development and prototyping phase. General Dynamics Mission Systems have been awarded an initial $15.9 million contract to develop a tactical, clandestine mining system that utilises an expendable UUV that can be launched from a submarine torpedo tube. Recent developments in the US are focused on utilising UUVs to covertly deliver mines, as some have raised questions over the effectiveness to deploy Quickstrike mines by air during a war.

Smart Sea Mines

Figure 2. Rheinmetall’s Asteria Smart Sea Mine. Photo Credit Naval News.

Sea mine technology has been advancing as improvements in technology have enabled them to be integrated with advanced sensors, embedded algorithms and decision-making systems. The term ‘smart sea mine’ has recently been applied to some sea mines in production. Figure 2 shows the Asteria smart sea mine, produced by RWM Italia (a subsidiary of Rheinmetall), which was first delivered to Australia in 2024 as part of their 2023 contract. Another smart sea mine currently in production is KoçSavunma’s MALAMAN, which has been designed specifically for the Turkish navy. Both build upon modern influence mines offering more advanced sensors and higher levels of autonomy in decision-making. However, there is no universally agreed-upon definition for smart sea mines, and as such it is not a specific category of sea mine with defined criteria. In this instance then, the term smart sea mines represent a marketing tool, rather than signifying a new category of sea mine. Nonetheless, they do capture a trend of increasing sophistication in sea mines towards greater autonomy.

Old Meets New: Balancing Smart and Conventional Sea Mines for Strategic Advantage

Technological advancements in smart sea mines mean they are more reliable and unlike traditional sea mines can distinguish between targets. A major issue with traditional ‘dumb’ sea mines is incorrect triggers and collateral damage. During the Ukraine-Russia war for example, several commercial vessels have been damaged by traditional sea mines in the Black Sea. Smarter sea mines, enabled by the embedded algorithms, differentiate between friend and foe, thus reducing collateral damage. However, these capabilities do come at a significant cost; smart sea mines are orders of magnitude more expensive than traditional sea mines. This makes the build-up of large inventories, which is needed to effectively area denial, more costly. Also, as the technological sophistication of smart sea mines increases, they could potentially become more liable to jamming, like has been seen with aerial drones.

Consequently, some defence analysts have argued for integrating traditional sea mines alongside modern smart mines as a cost-effective means of countering potential adversaries. A mixed inventory not only reduces reliance on expensive precision systems but also poses a greater challenge for minesweeping operations, as different mine types require varied detection and clearance methods. This approach echoes lessons emerging from the Ukraine–Russia war, where conventional sea mines continue to prove effective in deterring amphibious assaults, damaging enemy vessels, and disrupting maritime logistics. Ukraine, for example, is widely reported to have been using the Soviet-designed R-421-75 contact sea mine, deploying it as a moored sea mine to protect key ports such as Odesa, Ochakov, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny. As Western navies rebuild their sea mine inventories and capabilities, lessons drawn from this conflict would suggest complementing increasingly sophisticated, but more expensive sea mines, with larger stockpiles of cheaper traditional sea mines. This helps to maintain the inherent asymmetrical qualities sea mines possess, which could potentially have been lost as modern sea mines become more expensive.

Conclusion: The Strategic Case for Diverse Mine Inventories

With the resurgence of peer-to-peer conflict risks at the geopolitical hotspots of Taiwan and the Baltic Sea, Western Navy’s are once again renewing their interest in sea mines after decades of neglect. As technology has advanced modern sea mines have become increasingly sophisticated, utilising embedded algorithms to differentiate between targets and autonomously make decisions. But delivering these capabilities is orders of magnitude more expensive than traditional sea mines, and so potentially undermines the asymmetrical nature of sea mines. As navies rebuild inventories to levels needed to effectively area deny, it will likely be done through a combination of smart sea mines and traditional sea mines. To effectively deny a large area, it is a numbers game, and currently Western navies are under-stocked to achieve this. Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war in the Black Sea highlight that sea mines are still an effective weapon in modern naval warfare, allowing a much smaller force to deny and damage a much larger force for minimal cost. As concerns mount about the ability to deploy Quickstrike mines from the air should a conflict around Taiwan erupt, the US is focusing on developing clandestinely launched sea mines from UUVs. At the same time it is important not to forget numbers are key and larger inventories of sea mines will likely be needed to successfully deter China in Taiwan.

April 22, 2025

Key Takeaways

· The age of tank battlefield supremacy is over: Russia’s monthly tank losses contrast sharply with production rates, revealing how armour struggles in modern drone-dominated warfare.

· Cheap drones, devastating impact: $500 FPV drones are destroying multi-million-dollar tanks and outpacing conventional weapons in cost efficiency and volume on the battlefield.

· A broken cost equation: Using expensive missile systems to shoot down low-cost drones is unsustainable — militaries urgently need affordable and scalable countermeasures.

· Defences are evolving fast: Systems like the UK’s $0.14-per-shot ‘Rapid Destroyer’ and Sweden’s Loke show how low-cost, high-tech solutions are emerging to meet the drone threat head-on.

NATO countries have dedicated resources into expensive, ‘exquisite’ equipment designs that become part of small strike forces. This design approach made sense when our main objective was to undertake missions against technologically inferior insurgency forces in the Middle East and Africa. However, there are now evident flaws in their ability to fight prolonged wars against similarly advanced opponents. The UK has only 213 Challenger 2 tanks remaining after donating 14 to Ukraine. This is the same number of Russian tanks estimated to be destroyed in December 2024, or 15 days’ worth of tanks in September 2024.

The UKDJ (2025) reported there are no plans to increase this number despite additional military spending which cannot be attributed to just one factor. The UK is far from the front to deploy tanks effectively compared to mainland Europe. However, being overlooked in times of extra funding strongly suggests that the UK have calculated that the cost-benefit analysis for tanks skews heavily away from them in the age of cheap drone warfare.

One must only look at Russian production numbers to understand why. Even when attempting to build tanks as rapidly as possible, it is estimated that only around 80-90 Russian T-90M tanks are completed each year. This is an extremely low figure that does not allow for compensation for losses in the hundreds each month. Of course, sanctioning key parts of Russia’s advanced equipment played a part in this, but in general tanks are far too complex and resource intensive to be easily replaced when lost in such consistently large numbers. And why are the losses so high? Small, cheap drones. Indirectly through visual target recognition for artillery or other weapon systems or directly via dropping bombs based on the carry capacity of the drones, to open or exposed parts of vehicles.

FPV Drones

The inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drone has proved to be one of the most potent weapons in this Russia-Ukraine war. FPV drones are classified as Class I (mini/micro) drones because of the weight and altitude/range capabilities. FPVs - originally designed for civilian races - are controlled by pilots on the ground and are often crashed into targets, laden with explosives. They thrive in wars in which neither side has air superiority, since anti-aircraft systems prevent conventional air missions, causing Russia to resort to long-range glide-bomb tactics.

These incredibly low-cost drones have complicated the cost-benefit equation of air defence. While traditional air defence systems can neutralise these threats, using expensive military assets against low-cost consumer technology is an unsustainable economic equation. Reuters report that one such FPV drone, including an explosive warhead secured with cable ties, can cost under $500. This is in stark contrast to MANPADS missiles like the Stinger which cost governments between $480,000 and $1.375 million per unit.

Class I and II drones fly low with minimal signatures, can operate in swarms and can be autonomous, evading standard detection methods. Conventional air defence systems target traditional aircraft and missiles, not small, slow, unmanned systems. This capability gap requires urgent attention. Counter uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) solutions must evolve rapidly to keep pace with evolving drone technology and maintain effective defence capabilities.

However, as with many things in the West, government procurement seems to cost dramatically more than commercial procurement. For example, according to Chávez and Swed (2024), drones procured in the US DoD Replicator initiative, are approximately five times as expensive as commercial off-the-shelf models. This cost increase is claimed to be due to the military specifications. Ukraine have been far more resourceful, establishing huge FPV drone capabilities. Kamyshin, the previous Ukraine minister of strategic industries, told the Kyiv Independent this month that there “are more than 150 manufacturers in our country. Our capacity is to produce over 5 million FPV units per year”. No one knows what modern warfare requires more than Ukraine. The fact that they have pushed FPV drone production to these levels suggests that they are cost-effective means of fending off larger forces. There are now dozens of videos online of FPV drones dropping their bombs into the open hatch or the exposed parts of BMPs and various Russian main battle tanks like the T-72.

Loitering munitions

Loitering munitions are considered class II drones because of their range, weight and altitude capabilities. Loitering drones are more costly than FPV drones (the Zala lancet costs around $20,000) but have considerably more capabilities. As with class I drones, they can be deployed by a single soldier on the front lines who can control the drone. Some can even operate remotely using AI. Loitering drones can operate in even comms-denied zones providing surveillance. However, where loitering drones really shine is in their search-and-strike capabilities. They are often carrying high explosive munitions and will ‘Kamikaze’ into targets. They can eliminate armoured vehicles, including tanks, and have been seen to attack helicopters. Their small size makes them difficult to see, while their low altitude means they often go undetected by air defence systems.

Russia have developed their own in response to the numerous models the Ukrainians have been using from the West. For example, The ZALA Lancet is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition developed by the Russian company ZALA Aero Group. Ukraine has begun to create their own SETH UAS drones. Some have been delivered for battlefield testing in March of 2025 (see image below). These ‘Kamikaze’ drones operate via direct visual control, rather than pre-programmed GPS coordinates.

Ukrainian domestic loitering drones are still in their testing phase. Consequently, Ukraine has mostly relied on Western-made drones. The US-made switchblades and Anduril's Altius 600M/700M drones comprise the bulk of the orders. US companies are eager to produce their drones for Europe given the demand for these systems. Anduril is understood to be considering various British sites for a plant making advanced weapons (Hastings 2025), likely to include the Altius drone variants. This could be a prudent move for Anduril given the global trade war uncertainties. However, as we have discussed in earlier newsletters, whether the Trump administration could block US weapons being re-sold to Ukraine is of constant concern for Europe, which they are attempting to address with their own drone programs, like the HX-2 and OSKAR loitering drones from the UK and France respectively.

Ukrainian soldiers holding SETH UAS drones donated by the Come Back Alive charity. Source: Come Back Alive.

One-Way Attack Drones

Russia have also caught onto the new warfare reality. However, Russia has different strategic objectives. While Ukraine focuses on utilising their smaller force to maximise damage to the enemy within their own country, Russia seeks to maximise damage to infrastructure and military (and often civilian) targets. Apart from the glide bomb - with 3,000 bombs dropped in March alone - one-way attack drones have been their most effective tool. Though they are very similar to loitering drones (in Class II), one-way attack drones do not ‘loiter’, or hover around looking for targets but fly straight towards an intended target. These drones can replicate or replace missiles, depending on the drone’s size and capabilities.

At first, Russia relied heavily upon the Iranian Shahed-136/131, before utilising their own new cheaply made models like Gerbera. These drones will often fly ahead of real airstrikes as decoys to use up Ukraine’s air defence missiles, leaving critical targets like energy infrastructure defenceless. Shaheds themselves being larger, have been upgraded with guidance systems and electronic countermeasures, and can carry a 40kg explosive payload. Despite all this capability, the drones are estimated to cost only around $35,000 (CSIS 2025). The rise in these one-way attack drones has been dramatic. The chart below demonstrates the sudden dominance of these drones over any other form of missile. These drones were extremely rare for the first year of the war, before leaping up many magnitudes in late 2024 when production was ramped up.

Combating Cheap Drones

Broadly speaking, countering drones typically involves striking their launch sites or operators using kinetic means such as artillery or rocket fire. If that’s not feasible, drones can be intercepted mid-flight or disabled by jamming their communication links. However, as previously discussed, these defensive measures are often significantly more expensive than the low-cost drones they aim to neutralise.

In response, European companies, working closely with governments, have been developing a range of innovative solutions that address both the mass deployment of drones and their affordability. In any conflict, particularly one involving asymmetric forces, the smaller side must ensure its resources are used more efficiently than its adversary. For Ukraine, this means continuing to produce its own low-cost drones while also developing cost-effective ways to neutralise enemy systems. The following three case studies illustrate how this balance is being pursued.

MARSS Interceptors

MARSS Group, a Monaco-based company originally known for developing AI-powered security systems for superyachts, was an unlikely contender in the field of drone warfare. Their NiDAR C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial System) platform has been designed to address the escalating threat posed by drones—ranging from micro to large tactical models. Tailored for military and security applications, NiDAR dramatically improves the speed and accuracy with which operators can detect, verify, and track aerial threats. Capable of identifying hundreds of objects simultaneously from up to 25km away, the system uses artificial intelligence to autonomously distinguish drones from non-threats, such as birds, significantly reducing false positives and operator burden.

However, MARSS has gone beyond detection alone. The company has developed a full end-to-end C-UAS solution, featuring its own Interceptor-MR drones. These are launched from smart vertical tubes integrated with the NiDAR sensor network and are engineered to collide with and neutralise Class I and II drones from distances of up to 5km. It’s a novel and proactive approach - fusing advanced surveillance with kinetic response. However, costs remain uncertain as its first tests only begun in Q1 2025, according to EDR (2024).

Concept art of MARSS Interceptor-MR drone colliding with an FPV drone. Source: MARSS (2025).

Rapid Destroyer

Another promising European drone killer in development is being tested in the UK. British soldiers have successfully brought down swarms of drones in Wales using a new UK-made radiofrequency weapon, developed by a consortium led by French defence firm Thales. The experimental system, known as a Radiofrequency Directed Energy Weapon (RF DEW), otherwise referred to as ‘Rapid Destroyer’ (see below), uses invisible high-frequency waves to disrupt the internal electronics of airborne threats. During the trials, the Army managed to simultaneously detect, track and neutralise multiple drones in a single engagement. What is remarkable about this system is that each ‘shot’ costs around $0.14.

According to the Ministry of Defence, over 100 drones were neutralised during the series of tests using this new technology. This test marked the largest anti-drone swarm trials that the British have ever conducted.

Radiofrequency weapon, Rapid Destroyer, mounted to a vehicle, Source: UKDJ (2025)

The Saab ‘Loke’: An immediate drone killing solution

In a remarkable display of rapid collaboration unheard of in modern warfare, the Swedish Air Force, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), Saab, and several partners have successfully evaluated Concept "Loke" in just 84 days. This cutting-edge capability represents a major step forward in counter-drone technology, combining detection and neutralisation systems to address the growing threat of hostile unmanned aerial vehicles. Loke comprises two integrated components: one dedicated to drone detection, and the other to elimination.

At the heart of the detection capability is the Giraffe 1X radar system—a permanent, high-performance radar first developed in 2023. Though costly, its advanced automatic tracking function allows for simultaneous surveillance, target acquisition, and early warning. The UK Ministry of Defence was the first to acquire the system, purchasing 11 units for approximately $25 million (approximately £19 mil), according to Army Technology (2023). The inclusion of Giraffe 1X marks Loke as a technologically sophisticated and strategically valuable development in drone defence. Though expensive, these are permanent parts of a military’s arsenal.

What makes Loke cost-effective is the firing mechanisms. The firing element to Loke uses the Trackfire Remote Weapon Station (RWS). Trackfire is installed on various military platforms, including naval vessels like the Combat Boat 90. The system is not the weapon itself, which can be a variety of heavy machine guns and other weapons – ammunition for such weapons being relatively cheap. The Trackfire’s target and sensor data can be shared across platforms or transmitted within a single vehicle or vessel. Dual command capabilities reduce response time and sensor-to-shooter cycles, meaning the system can respond quickly to sudden drone location information. A team can drive the Loke system on readily available vehicles to the front where needed, eliminating drones that are supporting pushes/defences.

Complete system, including the Giraffe 1X (right), and vehicle with the trackfire remote weapon station mounted (left), Source: Saab (2025).

Whether or not Loke or similar systems can target and eliminate one-way attack drones is yet to be demonstrated on the battlefield, but the urgency for counter-drone technology means Loke will be tested soon enough. Though we shall cover it in another newsletter, a similar story is playing out at sea, with cost-effective ship killing drones being developed to suit different strategic objectives.

Conclusion: A New Age of Warfare, Defined by Cost and Creativity

Cheap drones have redefined the battlefield, enabling even modest forces to inflict outsized damage with low-cost, high-impact technology. From $500 FPVs disabling main battle tanks to loitering munitions striking deep behind enemy lines, this shift has exposed the limitations of traditional, high-cost military platforms.

Fortunately, Europe are beginning to respond with their own counter-drone creativity. From smart interceptors and loitering counter-drones to ultra-cheap directed energy weapons and advanced radar integration, Europe is rapidly developing systems subduing drone warfare’s asymmetric advantages. The goal is clear: neutralise enemy drones at a cost equal to—or ideally lower than—the cost of the drones themselves.

Victory in modern warfare will no longer rest solely upon industrial capacity—but will likely be achieved by the side that can innovate, adapt, and deploy faster than its adversary.

References

Allison G. (2025a) Britain has ‘no current plans’ to increase tank numbers, Mar 24. UKDJ. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-has-no-current-plans-to-increase-tank-numbers/.

Allison G. (2025b) British troops ‘shoot down’ swarm of over 100 drones, Apr 17. UKDJ. Available at: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-troops-shoot-down-swarm-of-over-100-drones/.

Chávez K, Swed O. (2024) SMALL DRONES FOR BIG MILITARIES: THE WAY AHEAD, Aug 15. War Room. Available at: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/small-drones/.

CSIS. (2025) Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes, Feb 19. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes#:~:text=Most%20of%20these%20one%2Dway,And%20they%20are%20relatively%20cheap.

Fornusek M. (2025) Ukraine has capacity to produce 5 million FPV drones per year, advisor says, Apr 19. Kyiv Independent. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-can-produce-5-million-drones-per-year-advisor-says/#:~:text=There%20are%20more%20than%20150,drones%20were%20produced%2C%20he%20noted.

Hastings R. (2025) Military drone factory planned for UK could create thousands of jobs, Mar 17. The I Paper. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/anduril-american-drone-firm-uk-factory-defence-economy-3586267.

Saab. (2025) From concept to impact - Saab and the Swedish Air Force Deploy "Loke”, Mar 17. Available at: https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2025/march/from-concept-to-impact---saab-and-the-swedish-air-force-deploy-loke.

Salerno-Garthwaite A. (2023) Giraffe 1X radar from Saab to be sold to UK, May 3. Army Technology. Available at: https://www.army-technology.com/news/giraffe-1x-radar-from-saab-to-be-sold-to-uk/.

Valpolini P. (2024) WDS 2024 – MARSS Interceptor MR killer-drone close to production, Feb 6. EDS. Available at: https://www.edrmagazine.eu/marss-interceptor-mr-killer-drone-close-to-production.

Zafra M, Hunder M Rao A, Kiyada S. (2024) How drone combat in Ukraine is changing warfare, Mar 26. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.

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Overview

To the consternation of many politicians and policy strategists alike, Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was judged to be woefully inadequate, with the exception of the nations unfortunate enough to share a border with Russia (Finland, Poland and the Baltics). Though it is true that global defence spending rates were highest in Europe since 2022, these figures obscure the reality that this increase barely scratches the surface in addressing decades of defence sector neglect. Countries like Germany and the UK were still viewed by most analysts to be dragging their feet if they were serious about military autonomy in the wake of an aggressive neighbour to the East. In contrast to the past 2 years, this article discusses the paradigm shift brought on by the dramatic friend vs foe recalibration of US foreign policy by the Trump administration. An administration that shows authoritarian regimes respect, while being contemptuous of Europe. Fortunately, rather than stunning Europe as was the case in February 2022, this new geopolitical reality appears to have spurred Europe and other non-NATO allies into action. Large spending packages, changes in debt policies and a reassessment of US military purchases all indicate a resurgence of European defence companies.

Within this deep dive into the changing defence landscape of NATO countries, we will begin with an assessment of the overall geopolitical landscape, including the continued threat posed by Russia. This overview leads us to discuss the promising developments to address the new European defence and security reality that have already begun in 2025. We then shift our focus from the macro geopolitics to specific companies in Europe that may prove to be pivotal if Europe seeks complete autonomy in its own security needs. This deep dive then addresses the elephant in the room, by focussing on one area in which there is both political will and government action in replacing US military hardware – the future fighter jet programs. Despite the many promising developments and signs of change, the next and most comprehensive section details the numerous challenges Europe must overcome to gain military autonomy from the United States. The deep dive then rounds the discussion off with some concluding remarks, in addition to some expectations of how the European rearmament will proceed from here.

Shifting Alliances

Europe’s Push for Defence Independence

To read the full deep dive please visit our website below, where the pdf can be downloaded for free.

https://www.challengerresearchgroup.com/product-page/europe-without-the-united-states-can-europe-achieve-security-autonomy-1

Photo Credit: Defense Advancement 2024

Highlights

1. Despite being outnumbered 3-1 in manpower, Ukraine limited Russian gains to just 0.6% of territory over the past year, with Russia suffering an estimated 1,500 casualties daily.

2. Ukraine’s European allies have provided several niche technological advantages, unlike Russia, whose exodus of talent leaves them scrambling to keep up with Ukrainian innovations.

3. Operation Spiderweb exemplified Ukraine's cost-effective innovations, using FPV drones to destroy 10% of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, as estimated by US and German analysts.

4. Milrem’s THeMIS has provided autonomous systems that enhance battlefield efficiency, contributing to Ukraine’s technological advantage.

5. Helsing, a European defence company, has rapidly deployed AI-driven tools to assist in operational decision-making amid evolving conflict conditions.

6. The French car company, Renault, has agreed to construct FPV drones for both France and Ukraine.

Ukraine's Secret Weapon

For 3 years, Ukraine has faced a stark numerical disadvantage on the battlefield, claiming they are outnumbered by a ratio of 3-1 in manpower, with an even greater disparity in equipment. On paper, Russia should be advancing through Ukraine with overwhelming force. Yet, as of May 2025, the reality on the ground tells a different story. Ukrainian officials report that over the past twelve months; Russia has captured just 0.6 percent of Ukrainian territory at the staggering cost of approximately one thousand five hundred casualties per day.

The situation with equipment is equally revealing. According to forecasts by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, at current rates of loss, Russia could exhaust its inventory of main battle tanks by 2026. In addition, satellite imagery and independent defence assessments indicate that Russia's once vast reserves of Soviet era armoured vehicles may also be depleted by 2025 or 2026.

This is not due to a lack of intent. In an interview with Ukrinform on 25 May, Oleg Ivashchenko, head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, made the position clear: “Their desire has not changed. They still want total control over Ukraine.”

How did we get here?

The problem, he says, lies elsewhere. “They are exhausted. Technologically, economically, and diplomatically.”

The economic and diplomatic aspects, including international sanctions, deteriorating relations with the West, and shifting developments in Africa and across the global South, are well recognised and widely analysed. This article will instead focus on the technological dimension of Russia’s exhaustion. Not on the large volumes of artillery, missiles and armoured vehicles where Russia continues to maintain an advantage in raw numbers, but on the smaller, purpose-built systems that deliver cost effective and asymmetric advantages on the battlefield. It is in this area, where flexibility, speed and precision matter most, that Russia struggles.

The central insight from this analysis is unmistakable: while Russia is capable of mobilising substantial industrial capacity to support its war in Ukraine, it lacks the most vital resource for long-term strategic advantage - human capital. The departure of a significant portion of the country's scientific, technical and entrepreneurial talent has critically undermined its capacity for innovation. Manufacturing alone cannot compensate for the loss of its brightest engineers, academics and start-up founders.

In contrast, Ukraine's allies have embraced a new doctrine shaped by urgency, efficiency and adaptability. In the current battlespace, it is speed and cost that determine success. Technologies and tactics are being developed and deployed not over years, but within a matter of weeks. This article examines how Ukraine's partners have responded to this shift, harnessing ingenuity and rapid iteration to meet the demands of a constantly evolving conflict. This was best showcased with operation spiderweb – a mission that saw Russia lose around 10% of its strategic bomber fleet to a swarm of cheap first-person view (FPV) drones - according to US and German estimates.

By 2023, approximately 900,000 people had emigrated from Russia, including around 2,500 scientists and an estimated 100,000 IT professionals. The impact has been deeply felt in business and technology sectors alike. Nebius, an AI cloud infrastructure company backed by 700 million US dollars in funding from Nvidia and Accel, was established from Yandex’s international operations. These were restructured to operate independently of Russia following the 2022 invasion. Today, the company employs over 1,300 professionals, many of whom are former Yandex employees who left the country in response to the geopolitical situation.

This article looks at some of the ingenious European innovations helping Ukraine exploit their asymmetrical advantages, helping to compensate for lower manpower and industrial capabilities.

Unmanned & Autonomous Systems

Unmanned systems like drones can do everything but take territory. Despite technological advancements, armies still require manpower to take (and hold) objectives. As a result, unmanned and autonomous systems have an asymmetrical advantage for defenders who seek to inflict maximum damage with minimum troops.

Milrem Robotics: THeMIS

THeMIS UGV with autocannon and cargo modules (Milrem 2025).

Not all unmanned systems are in the air. THeMIS is an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that is supporting ground forces in Ukraine. Made by Milrem Robotics in Estonia as part of a large European partnership, THeMIS is a modular operated vehicle with autonomous options like return to home features. It is designed to support ground troops. 15 UGVs have been in operation in Ukraine, carrying weapons, and apparatus to carry injured troops. THeMIS has now been purchased by 19 nations, including 8 NATO members: Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the UK, and the US. Sat systems like Starlink can allow hundreds of miles of range and multi-vehicle operations per operator - ideal for frontline support.

Key Contributions and Operational Roles

1. Logistics and Casualty Evacuation: THeMIS vehicles have been used extensively for transporting ammunition, equipment, and supplies to frontline positions, particularly in areas inaccessible to conventional vehicles or where the risk to human life is high. They have also played a crucial role in casualty evacuation, enabling wounded soldiers to be moved from the battlefield without exposing medics to enemy fire.

2. Mine Clearance and Route Demining: Several THeMIS units are equipped with specialized payloads for mine detection and clearance, supporting Ukrainian engineers in removing anti-tank mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). This has significantly reduced the risk to personnel during demining operations.

3. Combat Support and Reconnaissance: Armed variants of THeMIS have been supplied to Ukraine, expanding their utility to include direct combat support and intelligence-gathering missions. These platforms are being adapted for anti-tank, reconnaissance, and engineering tasks, based on operational feedback from Ukrainian forces.

4. Adaptation to Battlefield Conditions: Ukrainian operators have highlighted THeMIS’s effectiveness during challenging conditions, such as the muddy “bezdorizhzhia” season, where its mobility and low profile make it less susceptible to detection and immobilization compared to heavier vehicles.

Quantum-Systems: Ukraine High Tech Aerial Recon

Quantum-Systems, a Munich-based leader in unmanned aerial systems, has been at the forefront of integrating artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities into battlefield drones. In April Ukrainian company Frontline and German firm Quantum-Systems signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of defense technology production and integration, according to Militarnyi. This partnership on the whole aims to accelerate the development and deployment of next-generation aerial reconnaissance platforms.

Quantum Systems Trinity Pro eVTOL fixed wing drone (Quantum Systems 2025).

Key Contributions

1. AI-Enabled Reconnaissance: Quantum-Systems’ Vector and Trinity drones, now co-produced with Ukrainian partners, feature onboard AI for real-time image analysis and target identification. This reduces the latency between data collection and actionable intelligence, a critical advantage in fast-moving operational environments.

2. Autonomous Operations: The introduction of Drone Port infrastructure allows for automated drone launch, recovery, and recharging, enabling persistent surveillance with minimal operator intervention.

3. Localized Production: By establishing manufacturing capabilities within Ukraine (doubling its Ukraine production capacity in February), Quantum-Systems is not only meeting urgent battlefield demands but also facilitating technology transfer and fostering local expertise.

These drones provide Ukrainian forces with enhanced situational awareness, supporting precision targeting and rapid decision-making. The collaboration exemplifies how European firms can effectively integrate with local partners to deliver scalable, high-impact solutions in wartime conditions. The partnership includes technological and industrial collaboration, joint R&D projects, and the integration of Ukrainian innovations into the European defense system.

Helsing AI

HX-2 Helsing drones on top of casing (Helsing 2025)

While drones dominate the skies, an equally fierce and largely invisible war rages across the electromagnetic spectrum. Leading the charge in this domain is Helsing AI, a Berlin-based defence startup that has rapidly become a key player in Ukraine’s electronic warfare strategy.

In February 2025, Helsing signed a formal agreement with the Ukrainian government to supply advanced artificial intelligence technologies for drone operations, offering both hardware and software tailored to the specific demands of the battlefield. That same month, the company announced the completion of its first Resilience Factory in southern Germany - the first of several to be built across Europe - and confirmed plans to produce six thousand HX2 drones for Ukraine. These electrically powered drones are software driven, swarm capable, and designed for mass production. They can operate with limited connectivity, reidentify and engage targets autonomously, and resist electronic jamming, while a human operator remains in control at all times.

Following a valuation of €4.95 billion in mid-2024, Helsing pledged a £350 million investment in the United Kingdom, including a new manufacturing facility, reinforcing its position as one of the largest strike drone producers in the world. This expansion is necessary, as Helsing intends to send 6,000 HX-2 strike drones to Ukraine, after a prior order of 4,000 of the older HF-1 drone models.

Renault FBV Drone Production

FPV drone with munition payload (The Economist via Getty Images 2025).

As reported last week by French public radio, automotive giant Renault Group will be taking the lead in drone production. In June 2025, it was announced that Renault, in collaboration with a French defence SME, will establish drone manufacturing lines on Ukrainian territory. This move marks a significant deepening of the "win-win partnership" between France and Ukraine, combining Ukrainian battlefield experience and innovation in drone tactics with France’s industrial and technological strengths.

This development is more than a bilateral effort—it reflects a growing, continent-wide mobilisation. With Renault stepping in, it’s clear that major European players from across sectors are now getting on board, recognising both the urgency and the opportunity in supporting Ukraine through unmanned systems.

The drones produced under this partnership will meet both Ukrainian defence demands and serve as training assets for the French military. Ukraine aims to deploy over 4.5 million drones in 2025, with these systems reportedly responsible for around 70% of Russian equipment losses at the front, according to Le Monde. Meanwhile, the French armed forces, which currently operate several thousand drones, are looking to close the gap in their tactical capabilities.

Although the French defence minister did not disclose the specific models to be manufactured, he confirmed the drones would be deployed by Ukrainian forces and would support French units in maintaining realistic, operationally relevant training. Ukrainian operators will provide critical feedback based on frontline experience. “We’re embarking on a completely unprecedented partnership,” the minister stated.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s resilience on the battlefield has come to be defined by rapidly deployed innovations. While Russia continues to draw on vast reserves of equipment and industrial capacity, it is increasingly held back by a critical shortage of skilled people, technological stagnation, and strategic inflexibility. Ukraine, by contrast, has turned necessity into invention, building a defence ecosystem driven by speed, adaptability and precision through partnerships with advanced AI firms, agile startups and even automotive manufacturers.

This conflict is no longer decided solely by tanks and artillery, but by autonomous systems, software driven drones and integrated technologies. Ukraine has harnessed creativity and responsiveness to transform small, smart and cost-effective tools into strategic assets. It has shown that with the right partnerships and mindset, a nation can offset overwhelming disadvantages in manpower and firepower.

Helsing’s AI powered drones have brought cutting edge electronic warfare capabilities to Ukrainian forces. Quantum Systems is enabling real time aerial intelligence through locally produced autonomous drones. Milrem’s THeMIS ground vehicles are delivering logistical support, combat capability and casualty evacuation in the most dangerous environments. Renault’s move to establish drone production lines in Ukraine signals a wider drone production mobilisation across Europe’s industrial base, spurred on by the success of Operation Spider’s Web.

Russia’s losses are not just measured in troops and vehicles, but in time, talent and initiative. While Ukraine continues to face immense challenges (particularly manpower), it does so with a growing advantage in the domains that increasingly define modern warfare. The war is far from over, but the nature of victory is already changing.

References

• Duchêne S. (2025) 'Win-win partnership': French companies to manufacture drones in Ukraine, Jun 8. Euro News. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/08/win-win-partnership-french-companies-to-manufacture-drones-in-ukraine

• Helsing. (2025) Helsing to produce 6,000 additional strike drones for Ukraine, Press Release. https://helsing.ai/newsroom/helsing-to-produce-6000-additional-strike-drones-for-ukraine.

• Mukhina O. (2025) Battle-tested Ukrainian tech to enter European defense system through German partnership, Apr 15. EuroMaidan Press. https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/15/battle-tested-ukrainian-tech-to-enter-european-defense-system-through-german-partnership/

• Tril M. (2025) French carmaker to produce military drones in Ukraine alongside defence firm, Jun 7. EuroMaidan Press. https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/07/french-carmaker-to-produce-military-drones-in-ukraine-alongside-defence-firm/

• Quantum Systems. (2025) Quantum Systems is doubling production capacity in Ukraine, Feb 14. https://quantum-systems.com/blog/2025/02/14/quantum-systems-is-doubling-production-capacity-in-ukraine-at-a-critical-moment/