Aviation is entering a decisive stage within its decarbonisation trajectory. The outcome will not be determined by breakthroughs in engineering alone, nor by optimistic technology roadmaps. It will be shaped by state capacity: by governments’ willingness to absorb cost, tolerate disruption, and make irreversible infrastructure decisions in an increasingly constrained global system.

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Hydrogen-powered flight is often presented as aviation’s inevitable zero-carbon end state. In the long run, this assessment is broadly correct. Hydrogen offers an appealing pathway to eliminating carbon emissions from long-haul aviation, one of the most difficult segments of the transport system to decarbonise. But mainstream hydrogen-fuelled aviation is by no means inevitable and is certainly not imminent. The transition to hydrogen is not a simple fuel switch. It is a structural transformation of the aviation system itself, and one that will unfold slowly, unevenly, and only where political and fiscal conditions allow.

The danger lies in assuming that hydrogen’s long-term promise absolves governments of the urgent need to act meaningfully in the present.

A Sector with No Easy Substitutes

Aviation occupies a uniquely difficult position in the decarbonisation landscape. While its share of global carbon dioxide emissions is smaller than that of road transport or power generation, its climate impact is amplified by high-altitude effects of contrails and black carbon. At the same time, global demand for air travel continues to rise, with passenger numbers expected to more than double over the next three decades.

Unlike road transport, aviation cannot rely on rapid fleet turnover or straightforward electrification. Batteries lack the energy density required for long-haul flight, and commercial aircraft are designed to operate for decades. These structural constraints have narrowed the range of viable decarbonisation options to two: sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs) and hydrogen-powered aircraft.

These pathways are often presented as competitors. In reality, they are sequential. SAFs offer emissions reductions within the existing system. Hydrogen represents a potential end state beyond it. But this sequencing only works if policymakers are honest about timelines and the strategic cost of waiting. There is also no guarantee that this sequence will be completed − some states might opt for SAFs in the long-term as they become more efficient, leveraging national advantages in feedstock availability or balking at the huge cost of hydrogen transition. Brazil is one likely example with its dominance in sugarcane.

Hydrogen’s Promise, Infrastructure’s Price

From a technical perspective, hydrogen is an attractive aviation fuel. By mass, it contains roughly four times more energy than kerosene and produces no carbon dioxide at the point of use. For long-haul flight, where batteries remain unviable, hydrogen is one of the few routes to full decarbonisation that does not rely on perpetual offsets.

The aircraft itself is not the binding constraint. Given sufficient time, manufacturers will design airframes capable of carrying hydrogen safely. Certification pathways will emerge. Aviation has adapted to new propulsion technologies before, and it will do so again.

The real challenge lies in the scale and cost of change needed.

Hydrogen does not slot into the existing aviation system. It requires that system to be rebuilt around it. Liquid hydrogen’s low volumetric energy density demands new aircraft architectures. Its cryogenic storage requirements necessitate entirely new fuel logistics. Airports − among the most space-constrained, safety-critical pieces of infrastructure in the global economy − would need to be retrofitted with specialised storage, handling, and refuelling systems. These are not marginal upgrades. They are reinventions of a whole system.

Each layer of change introduces cost, delay, and political risk. And because aviation is a globally integrated industry, these changes cannot be implemented in isolation. Aircraft certification, fuel standards, and safety regimes must be recognised across jurisdictions. Coordination failures delay adoption. Fragmentation limits scale.

Even under optimistic assumptions, this points to a slow and uneven rollout of hydrogen aviation, concentrated initially in specific regions, aircraft classes, and routes. And despite hydrogen being most promising for long-haul flight, it will likely enter short-haul aviation first, due to the nature of approval and implementation within a highly safety-conscious industry.

Projections for hydrogen fuel adoption compared with SAF across commercial aviation. Source: Boeing, 2025.

Hydrogen’s Scale, State Capacity’s Limits

Energy availability compounds these challenges. Producing low-carbon hydrogen at scale requires vast quantities of clean electricity, and losses accumulate across electrolysis, liquefaction, storage, and transport. This “energy tax” raises costs and intensifies competition with other decarbonising sectors, from electric vehicles to heavy industry and data centres.

Yet even in regions with abundant clean power, infrastructure remains the binding constraint. Retrofitting airports for hydrogen requires large, upfront investment well in advance of commercial demand. Infrastructure must exist before hydrogen aircraft can scale − but demand for that infrastructure depends on aircraft being available. This coordination problem is not technical; it is political and fiscal.

The implication is not that hydrogen aviation is unworkable. It is that it scales slowly. It favours states with surplus clean energy, deep capital markets, and the institutional capacity to commit to long-term, capital-intensive projects with uncertain outcomes. Elsewhere, adoption will be delayed, indirect, dependent on imported fuels, or even non-existent. Hydrogen’s long-term promise is real. But it is dependent on global co-ordination, political will, and vast capital requirements.

SAFs: The Only Near-Term Option

This is where sustainable aviation fuels assume their strategic importance. SAFs are often criticised for being expensive, feedstock-limited, or insufficient as a permanent solution. These criticisms are not entirely wrong. But they miss the strategic function that SAFs can perform.

SAFs matter because they work within the aviation system as it exists today. They can be blended with kerosene, deployed across existing fleets, and scaled incrementally without requiring new aircraft or airport infrastructure. They allow emissions reductions to begin immediately, rather than being deferred until a better alternative is ready.

From a geopolitical perspective, SAFs are comparatively frictionless. They preserve global interoperability in an industry that depends on it. They allow states to reduce aviation emissions without committing to a complete rebuild of fleets and fuel systems. And they buy time. Time for hydrogen technologies to mature, for certification regimes to stabilise, and for infrastructure decisions to be made with greater clarity and purpose.

For many governments, SAFs are not a compromise. They are a rational response to constraint.

The Strategic Risk of Waiting

The central risk in aviation decarbonisation is a mismatch between climate urgency and technological readiness. Hydrogen’s promise has encouraged some to treat it as an impending solution, justifying delay in the deployment of transitional measures. This is a high-stakes gamble.

If aggressive SAF scaling is postponed in anticipation of hydrogen aircraft that arrive decades later, the result will be a new generation of fossil-fuel lock-in at precisely the moment that emissions reductions matter most. Aviation’s long asset lives mean that choices made − or deferred − in the next decade will shape emissions profiles well beyond the mid-century.

At the same time, an exclusive focus on SAFs carries its own risks. Over-investment in transitional fuels could create stranded assets if hydrogen achieves a rapid, subsidised breakthrough later in the century. But this risk is asymmetric. Delayed action locks in emissions. Early action preserves optionality.

The most resilient strategy is therefore not a binary choice, but a phased sequencing: scale and improve SAFs now, while preparing but not prematurely committing to hydrogen’s systemic transformation.

The Case for Fuel Optionality

Aviation’s decarbonisation challenge is often framed as a contest between fuels. In reality, it is a test of state capacity. Hydrogen remains the ideal end state for zero-carbon aviation, and continued investment in its development is essential. But its success depends on a sequence of conditions that will not materialise uniformly − redesigned aircraft, harmonised certification regimes, surplus clean energy, and large-scale infrastructure investment.

SAFs offer strategic insurance against this uncertainty. They enable immediate emissions reductions, preserve flexibility, and keep multiple pathways open in a sector defined by long asset lives and high costs. This optionality is a necessity, not a weakness.

Hydrogen may ultimately define aviation’s future. But SAFs will determine whether the sector begins decarbonising in time to meaningfully alter aviation’s emissions curve before it becomes mere tokenism.

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References

International Air Transport Association (2025) Hydrogen for aviation. A future decarbonization solution for air travel? Available at: https://www.iata.org/globalassets/iata/publications/sustainability/h2-for-aviation-facts.pdf

McKinsey & Company/Clean Sky 2 (2020) Hydrogen-powered aviation: a fact-based study of hydrogen technology, economics, and climate impact by 2050. Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: https://www.clean-hydrogen.europa.eu/system/files/2020-06/20200507_Hydrogen%2520Powered%2520Aviation%2520report_FINAL%2520web%2520%2528ID%25208706035%2529.pdf

Europe’s greatest geopolitical paradox is that the energy it buys to sustain itself empowers the very regimes that can destabilise it. Diversification is an illusion of safety. Real security comes only from making fossil fuels irrelevant. Net zero is Europe’s most potent instrument of strategic autonomy.

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China understood early that lacking fossil fuel reserves was not a weakness but an incentive. Instead of chasing oil and gas, it chose to control the technologies that will end global dependence on both. Today, China exports more clean-energy technology than America produces in fossil fuels - an unprecedented inversion of energy power. Europe can do the same, turning itself from an energy-dependent continent into the world’s clean-tech centre of gravity.

It is no coincidence that the fossil-fuel-rich United States resists aggressive climate commitments - pulling out of Paris and skipping COP30 - while fossil-fuel-poor China champions green tech, whose clean-energy manufacturing juggernaut needs the entire world as a customer.

Both superpowers are pursuing their interests with clarity. Europe is not. It lurches between ambition and retreat, repeating the familiar pattern of under-investment in defence, strategic technology and long-term planning, until a crisis erupts.

Europe again behaves reactively, absent any unified vision to shape its own future.

Yet for once, the strategic choice is unmistakable. The price of transition is trivial compared with the cost of remaining permanently vulnerable to adversarial suppliers. Paying for Russian oil and gas, then paying again to support Ukraine against the weapons funded by that revenue, far exceeds the cost of achieving net zero.

This article explains why the EU and UK should treat clean energy as a strategic imperative on par with defence spending, rather than an optional climate-driven goal. I also emphasise that this case should be made not only to politicians and strategists, but clearly to the public. Framing net zero in terms of defence and security reaches right-wing voters far more effectively than environmental messaging, further supporting my argument.

The Geopolitical Leverage Problem: Why Fossil Fuels Are a Strategic Weakness

Understanding Europe’s current vulnerability requires confronting an uncomfortable truth about how energy shapes power in the modern world. In 2021, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the bloc imported over 45% of its natural gas imports and 27% of its crude oil from Russia. This was not merely a commercial transaction. Every cubic metre of pipeline gas and every barrel of oil represented a mechanism through which Moscow could apply pressure on European governments at moments of diplomatic crisis.

Algeria presents an equally instructive case study of how energy dependency creates strategic vulnerability.

Algeria is currently undertaking an unprecedented military modernisation programme, with defence spending rising by 76% to reach 18.3 billion dollars in 2024. Between 2016 and 2023, Russia supplied 61.3% of Algeria’s military imports, worth 5.8 billion dollars, making Algeria a critical vehicle for Russian military influence in the Mediterranean. Algeria has now acquired Russian fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets, a capability that transforms it into the most militarily powerful nation in its immediate region.

Yet here lies the strategic bind: Italy, Europe’s gateway to North Africa, has become almost entirely dependent on Algerian gas. Algeria supplies Italy directly via the TransMed pipeline, which carries up to 30 billion cubic metres annually. Italy’s energy anchor is now a nation with strong Russian military ties and deepening ambitions for regional dominance. Should tensions between Europe and North Africa escalate, Italy would face an impossible choice between supporting European interests and preserving its energy supply.

Across the Middle East, the export power of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE gives them enormous leverage over global markets. As geopolitics hardens and energy becomes a weapon, Europe’s industrial sophistication counts for little when its power lifelines can be severed. This is not hypothetical. In 2021, European countries paid around €99 billion for Russian energy imports. That money aided a regime preparing for war that continues to destabilise Europe.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukrainian power plants, substations, gas-storage facilities and transmission lines, demonstrating how fragile centralised fossil-fuel systems are under military pressure. Ukraine has also struck Russian oil refineries and fuel depots, underscoring that large, concentrated energy assets are easy targets for disruption. Pipelines, compressor stations, refineries and high-voltage corridors each present single points of failure. Renewables are far less so: they are decentralised, modular and vastly harder to weaponise.

Steps in the Right Direction

The response to the 2022 energy crisis demonstrated that European governments understand this vulnerability and can act decisively. Through the REPowerEU plan, launched in May 2022, the European Commission mobilised nearly 300 billion euros to accelerate the energy transition. The results have been striking. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU had collapsed from 150 billion cubic metres in 2021 to just 43 billion cubic metres (Figure 1). By 2023, Russia supplied only 3.9% of petroleum oil and 16% of pipeline gas to the bloc. Alternative suppliers filled much of the gap, but there is a significant long-term transformation coming via renewable energy deployment.

Figure 1. Russian gas imports to the EU between 2021-2024.

In 2024 alone, the EU installed approximately 77 gigawatts of new renewable energy capacity. Wind energy capacity has increased by 234 gigawatts since 2022 under REPowerEU. By the end of 2024 cumulative installed solar PV capacity in the EU stood almost 338 gigawatts. Renewables now generate about 47% of the EU’s electricity, a dramatic shift from the pre-crisis era. Meanwhile, the EU has set a binding target of at least 42.5% renewables in its total energy consumption by 2030, with many analysts projecting the bloc could achieve around 45% or more if current trends continue.

More importantly, Europe has begun to understand that the transition is not a cost but an investment. Renewable electricity has reached record cost-competitiveness. In southern Europe, utility-scale solar now produces electricity at costs as low as 30 euros per megawatt-hour, undercutting coal and gas on price alone. This economic advantage has spurred massive corporate participation, with European corporations signing over 10 gigawatts of power purchase agreements in 2022, a figure that has only grown since. The strategic value of these investments extends beyond carbon reduction: each kilowatt of renewable capacity is a permanent reduction in foreign leverage.

China’s Template: Why the Numbers Demand European Attention

China’s approach to energy independence provides the crucial historical comparison that European policymakers must internalise. China understood decades ago that controlling one’s energy future means controlling one’s political future. The nation is simultaneously among the world’s largest fossil fuel importers and the undisputed leader in renewable energy manufacturing. This is no contradiction; it is strategic genius.

In recent years China has surged ahead as the world’s leading exporter of clean-energy technologies - including solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles and wind-turbine systems. Indeed, research shows China’s clean-tech exports since 2018 have approached US $1 trillion.

By contrast, the Trump Administration relies on fossil-fuel exports to project energy-power. In 2024, US exports of petroleum (crude oil and related liquids) reached a record high - about US $193 billion in real-dollar terms (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Comparing dollar exports of Chinese green technology and US oil.

While exact annual cross-country export comparisons are difficult to pin down, multiple analysts highlight that China’s clean-tech export growth has now overtaken the scale and geopolitical weight of US fossil-fuel exports. For example, in August 2025 alone China’s clean-tech shipments hit around US $20 billion in a single month.

The scale of China’s manufacturing dominance is staggering. The nation produced 277 gigawatts of solar capacity and 79 gigawatts of wind capacity in 2024 alone. Chinese companies control nearly 60% of global renewable capacity growth. In August 2025, China exported $20 billion in clean energy technology in a single month. Meanwhile, Chinese clean energy industries contributed more than 10% of China’s GDP in 2024 for the first time, generating an estimated 1.9 trillion dollars in total economic output.

The strategic implications are profound. China has transformed renewable energy manufacturing into the cornerstone of its geopolitical and economic power. When Belt and Road Initiative countries need renewable energy infrastructure, they turn to Chinese companies backed by Chinese financing. This is precisely the model of geopolitical leverage that Europe currently experiences with fossil fuels, except now it operates in the opposite direction: China gains influence by providing the technologies the world requires for decarbonisation, not by controlling supplies of depleting hydrocarbons.

The European Opportunity: Becoming the World’s Clean Technology Superpower

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Humanity stands at the precipice of an artificial intelligence (AI) revolution; one that promises to change how we live, work and advance society. Yet, surging demand for compute power and data centres will introduce a new wave of sustainability pressures, which are difficult to justify as we continue to confront the realities of the climate crisis. AI is set to reshape multiple facets of our lives and will dramatically boost the capabilities of business and technology, as well as permeating into the everyday through the proliferation of AI generated content. However, in light of growing climate concerns, the rapid uptake of AI threatens to expose hypocrisies surrounding corporate sustainability goals and common environmental activism practices. AI therefore represents a crucial paradox. It has the capacity to empower major scientific breakthroughs whilst also becoming an accelerant of the climate crisis if expansion is left unchecked.

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The AI Boom

The adoption of AI is taking place at an unprecedented rate, even surpassing the pace of previous waves of technological advancement. A 2024 study entitled “The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI”, states that, within two years of the introduction of generative AI, 39.4% of US adults aged 18-64 had used it. By comparison, the usage rate of the internet by US adults within two years of its introduction was stated to be 20%. This may oversimplify contributing factors to these figures, such as the only prerequisite for the use of AI being access to the internet – whereas the internet required an extensive foundational infrastructure. Today, the prevalence of generative AI Large Language Models (LLMs) indicate that AI will only become more entrenched in our everyday lives, as LLMs become more complex and generations grow up having only known a world with chatbots. And this ignores the most important use case of AI – its ability to transform business as we know it, potentially unlocking world-changing innovations across a wealth of industries.

AI is embedding itself in every business sector. Applications include healthcare diagnostics, fraud detection, route optimisation, handheld AI companions – the possibilities are limitless. The promise of AI to benefit the advance of society is colossal. As LLMs become increasingly complex and efficient, the potential for ground-breaking progress becomes more likely, as models are able to process vast amounts of data at faster speeds and greater volumes. But this is precisely where the paradox of artificial intelligence becomes clear. Ever-increasing demand for computing and inference capabilities means that GPUs (Graphics Processing Units) will be required to power data centres at vast scales. Model training en masse and surging inference demand for daily queries requires the deployment of clusters of thousands of GPUs which leads to staggering energy, water and material costs. Chips also have finite lifespans and will either need to be replaced or upgraded with even more advanced versions, thus contributing to higher energy usage.

Analysts expect that the global AI infrastructure market will grow rapidly into the 2030s and beyond, with Fortune Business Insights estimating the AI infrastructure market to increase from USD 242.72 billion in 2024 to USD 584.86 billion in 2032 – a CAGR of 11.7% within this forecast period. This will translate into more data centres, more GPU clusters and more advanced, powerful chips overtime, as NVIDIA and its competitors continue to bring cutting-edge chips to market.

Figure 1. Global map of large data centre clusters, 2024 (International Energy Agency, 2025)

Of course, the spread of data centres worldwide is dictated by a range of factors – principally energy/resource availability, energy costs, climate, infrastructure and the regulatory environment. As shown in figure 1, this has resulted in specific data centre hubs forming in the US, Europe and regions of the Asia Pacific – mostly in the Global North. Immense energy demand and cooling requirements of data centres mean that locations with cooler climates and a strong foundation of AI-ready infrastructure are naturally prioritised. Like in figure 1, this has the effect of creating areas where data centres are concentrated which has obvious ramifications. In the US, for example, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reported that, in six states, data centres consumed over 10% of annual state electricity supply during 2023: Virginia, North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Oregon and Wyoming. Virginia led by a wide margin, with 25% of 2023 electricity supply going towards data centre operation.

Virginia – Lessons from Data Centre Alley

Loudoun County in North Virginia has been dubbed “Data Centre Alley”, being home to the densest concentration of data centres in the world. But what makes this location such an important AI hub and how can this small region act as a warning about the future of data centre development globally?

Northern Virginia was an initial internet hub in the 1990s, with many tier-1 internet providers routing extensive backbones of internet fibres through the state. Overtime, this led to Virginia becoming a low-latency region, ideal for providing rapid internet services for major US and global markets. With close proximity to Washington D.C., and a reliable supply of relatively low-cost electricity through Dominion Energy, the region became a frontrunner for AI investment. Crucially, Amazon Web Services made North Virginia its primary cloud hub in 2006 with Google, Microsoft and Meta later adding to the concentration. As well as having a robust technological bedrock for AI infrastructure, Virginia offers tax exemptions and permitting fast tracks for data centres to further boost AI development in the region. As of September 2025, Data Centre Map lists 637 operational data centres in Virginia, with the vast majority of them being located in North Virginia around Data Centre Alley. By comparison, the next two closest states per number of data centres, Texas and California, host 388 and 319 respectively.

The energy and water requirements needed to cool vast numbers of GPU clusters in Virginia are colossal. Exact figures are difficult to verify, yet 25% of Virginia’s 2023 electricity supply was consumed by data centres. This has led to huge strain on local energy grids, with Dominion Energy struggling to meet energy demand at times of peak usage. With such high demand for electricity in the region, backup generators are relied upon across Virginian data centres to mitigate the risk of energy outages – a threat that can be especially damaging in the power-intensive realm of AI processing. To reduce the strain on state power supply, local authorities have encouraged periodic use of these backup generators, which are primarily diesel-powered. Unsurprisingly, these generators produce significant quantities of air pollutants when in use (carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide etc.). During periods of severe energy demand and grid stress, thousands of diesel generators may be running simultaneously, degrading air quality within the region as well as contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, data centre energy demand in Virginia leads to a dual energy conundrum – running on the premise of uninterrupted power supply to place strain on local grids, while calling on backup generators to guarantee continuous operation, at the cost of amplified local pollution.

Data centre water usage is also at extreme levels in Virginia, as vast amounts of water are required for evaporative cooling systems that prevent servers from overheating. According to the Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EESI), data centres in North Virginia consumed almost 2 billion gallons of water in 2023, a volume that was reported to be a 63% increase from 2019 levels. This represents a substantial increase in a short space of time, and hints at a worrying precedent for heightened water demand as data centre numbers look set to grow rapidly in the US and worldwide. The EESI also state that an average sized data centre can use up to 110 million gallons of water per year, which is the same as the annual water consumption of around 1000 households.

Figure 2. Top ten data centre markets by installed capacity (Gigawatts), 2024 (International Energy Agency, 2025)

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Photo Credit: WAWW Publishing

Aviation is well known to be a uniquely damaging source of pollution and CO₂ emissions. But just how much of an impact has this ~900-billion-dollar industry had on our global atmosphere and climate? The reality is worse than raw emission data suggests, due to differences between total emissions and the proportional effect on climate warming. Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) is an emerging solution which could help reduce this issue and, according to the International Air Transport Association, SAFs are the best solution to combat aviation emissions in the next 15-20 years. This article explores the shifting landscape of aviation emissions, defines what qualifies as Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), and assesses why SAFs remain the most practical near-term solution compared to hydrogen and electric alternatives. It also sheds light on the often-overlooked geopolitical dynamics driving the global race to produce, regulate, and scale SAF adoption.

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Figure 1. Nuclear reactor capacity leaders, with prospective capacity included (Statista 2024).

Figure 2. Solar capacity by region between 2014-2024, with Asia Pacific increasing its dominance on the sector (Solar Insure 2025).

Doomberg appears to suggest that China’s coal boom proves the country does not genuinely care about the environment and is simply deceiving naïve liberals. This claim, however, is easily disproven. Over the past several decades, China’s primary environmental concerns have centred on issues such as severe air pollution. Indeed, a decade ago, China accounted for nearly all of the world’s 50 most polluted cities, highlighting the urgent domestic pressures driving its environmental policies. Yet, following the boom in EVs and other renewable strategies, China features in that list only a handful of times today, with Beijing’s air quality improving dramatically (Figure 3) over recent years (see our recent deep dive into the last 10 years of PM2.5 pollution globally for more details). Note that this is more than a 60% decline in just 10 years.

Figure 3. Average annual PM2.5 air pollution levels in Beijing, China between 2013 and 2023 (Statista 2025).

In fact, I would argue that China takes the environment seriously. They, unlike the Trump administration, believe their scientists when they say that sea-level rise and extreme weather events leave Chinese coastal cities particularly vulnerable. They must, however, weigh this concern with the reality of their rapidly aging workforce and geostrategic objectives. They recognise that growth must come first if they are to have any hope of maintaining superpower status, so they try to achieve the growth of the past, while addressing environmental challenges – unsuccessfully, I would add. If the West were to abandon climate change mitigation efforts, it would in turn severely damage China’s economic advantage, and by extension, its geopolitical position.

If Ted Cruz is correct, a far more plausible reason for China’s involvement in the US climate change debate is about economic advantage. China has long dominated the electric battery market, after buying out US firms struggling a decade ago, such as when US battery manufacturer A123 was purchased by Wanxiang Group in 2013, for $257m –now worth more than 3x that amount. Thanks to government subsidies, Chinese EVs like BYD are overtaking Tesla as the most purchased EV globally. Solar, too, has priced out many American firms. Mass production made these feats possible however, so if demand dies down, so too does their economic advantage. If the US pulls closer to fossil fuels, the environment suffers, but so too do Chinese producers of renewable technologies. None of these efforts have anything to do with the Navy or military production. China knows full well that the US will continue to react to Chinese military growth, as demonstrated by the $150 billion + in military defence allocation in the ‘Big Beautiful Bill’ that was recently signed into law.

Finally, Doomberg's conclusion veers into tinfoil-hat territory. He claims: “Recognizing the reality that Western leaders have ceded so much geopolitical power to their enemies in the name of climate change—the impacts of which have been purposely exaggerated in a knowing campaign of deception fuelled by dirty money funnelled to Western elites—is jarring to internalize.”

This Reddit-style conspiracy theory raises more questions than it answers. Which climate impacts have been exaggerated, exactly? By whom? What “dirty money” and which “elites”? The most rigorous investigative work on this subject - Merchants of Doubt by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway - details how the misinformation campaign on climate change was led by fossil fuel interests, not green lobbyists. Yes, there are questionable actors on both sides, but Doomberg cherry-picks examples to push an old ideological narrative: that belief in climate science is simply anti-capitalist propaganda, orchestrated by shadowy elites and China. It's not analysis - it's a recycled talking point dressed up as insight. Their audience deserves more considered analysis.

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1. Introduction

Air pollution has emerged as a critical global issue that affects both developed and developing nations. The presence of particulate matter, particularly PM2.5, poses significant health risks due to its ability to penetrate deep into the respiratory tract and enter the bloodstream. Exposure to PM2.5 is associated with a range of serious health conditions, including respiratory and cardiovascular diseases (Alexeeff et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2019), aggravated asthma (Guo et al. 2019), and premature death. As highlighted by recent studies, the detrimental effects of PM2.5 extend beyond physical health, potentially impacting cognitive development and contributing to neurodevelopmental disorders. Addressing PM2.5 pollution is not only an environmental imperative but also a matter of public health, social justice, and sustainable development.

Though air pollution can occur in rural regions, it is firmly established that urbanisation strongly correlates with PM2.5 concentrations (Shi et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020). Traffic congestion, population density, economic activity etc. all contribute to this well established connection. For this reason, when comparing regions and areas, this article will focus solely on urban areas.

The strategies employed to combat PM2.5 pollution vary significantly across the globe. Developed nations, particularly those in North America and Europe, have made notable progress in reducing PM2.5 levels through stringent air quality regulations, technological innovation, and transitions to cleaner energy sources. These efforts have resulted in significant improvements in air quality and public health. However, the progress achieved in developed countries contrasts sharply with the challenges faced by developing nations, where rapid urbanisation, energy poverty, and limited regulatory capacity continue to contribute to dangerously high pollution levels. The path forward for all nations lies in collaborative efforts to implement cleaner, smarter, and more equitable growth models, leveraging technological advancements and international cooperation to achieve sustainable air quality improvements.

1.1 PM2.5 : Composition and Health Effects

PM2.5 refers to airborne particulate matter with diameters of 2.5 micrometres or less. These fine particles are released from a range of sources, including vehicle exhausts, industrial activity, residential heating, and natural phenomena such as wildfires (Law et al. 2025). Owing to their minuscule size, PM2.5 particles are capable of penetrating deep into the respiratory system, reaching the lungs and even entering the bloodstream. This makes them particularly hazardous to human health, with exposure linked to a wide array of serious conditions, including cardiovascular disease, aggravated asthma, reduced lung function, and premature death.

PM2.5 was selected as the primary focus for this analysis over PM10 - particles with a diameter of less than 10 microns - due to its greater potential for harm. While both pose health risks, PM2.5 can travel deeper into the lungs and permeate the circulatory system, significantly increasing the likelihood of severe outcomes such as heart disease, lung cancer, and chronic respiratory issues (UN 2021). Vulnerable populations, such as children, the elderly, and those with pre-existing health conditions, are particularly at risk. Long-term exposure has been associated with impaired lung development in children, cognitive deficits, and potential links to neurodevelopmental disorders including autism spectrum disorder.

The global burden of PM2.5 exposure is stark. Air pollution has become the second leading risk factor for death worldwide, contributing to an estimated 8.1 million deaths annually (HEI 2024). The vast majority (up to 90%) of this burden stems from noncommunicable diseases like heart disease, stroke, diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and lung cancer. In India, a landmark study co-authored by Joel Schwartz from Harvard’s Department of Environmental Health revealed that, for every 10 micrograms per cubic metre increase in PM2.5 concentration, mortality rose by 8.6% (Stearnbourne 2024).

Given these risks, the World Health Organization (WHO) has set stringent air quality guidelines. Annual average PM2.5 concentrations should not exceed 5 µg/m³, and daily exposures should remain below 15 µg/m³ on more than three to four days per year (WHO 2021). Yet in many regions, particularly across low- and middle-income countries, these thresholds are routinely breached— posing an ongoing and urgent threat to public health.

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