From Fragmented to Formidable: Aligning UK, France and Germany’s Defence Industries

Geopolitics Article

A Blueprint for European Defence Unity

Europe’s Defence Awakening

After two years of painfully slow mobilisation following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s defence awakening is finally underway.

Germany: After the €100 billion Bundeswehr special fund, Berlin now plans a 46% increase to the core defence budget by 2028, keeping it on track for 3.5% of GDP. This trajectory, once unthinkable, is now credible.

France: Military spending will rise to €57.2 billion in 2026 and €63.4 billion in 2027 - a 25.5% increase over 2025 levels. But unlike Germany, these gains rely on politically risky cuts to pensions, healthcare, and social programmes. After 2027, growth flattens.

United Kingdom: With spending climbing toward £66 billion by 2028, Britain is on track to exceed 2.5% of GDP, with potential to push beyond 3% under recent NATO pledges. Defence enjoys broad political consensus, and London is positioning itself as Europe’s primary naval and expeditionary power.

For the first time in decades, Europe’s three largest defence economies are moving in the same direction. There is momentum, and a recognition that in a multipolar world, where neither superpower can be fully relied upon, Europe cannot afford to remain militarily fragmented. Still, these signals from Europe’s largest defence economies are encouraging. For the first time in decades, there’s momentum - and a recognition that Europe cannot afford to be militarily fragmented in a multipolar world in which for the first time since WW2, neither superpower can be trusted. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call.

Money Without Structure is Waste

Yes, defence budgets have risen across the continent. But money alone is meaningless without the industry, vision, and capabilities to make best use of it. Japan - making its first foreign warship sale since WWII - recently outbid Germany for the order of 11 frigates for Australia. The Australians cited quality, cost, and delivery time. Similarly, South Korean shipyards, because they specialise and build to scale, produce naval vessels more cheaply (especially in PPP terms) than their U.S. counterparts. The lesson is clear: specialise in what your country is best at, plan to build at scale to reduce cost, and ensure that your equipment is standardised, a non-issue for one nation, but vital for Europe and NATO.

Europe still lacks coordination. France, Germany, the UK (and potentially Italy) all continue to fund separate tank lines, naval platforms, and overlapping aircraft programmes, resulting in duplication, inefficiency, and an arsenal too disjointed to deter a peer adversary like Russia, let alone match the industrial tempo of the US or China. Ukraine has already paid the price for this fragmentation, forced to operate a patchwork of armoured vehicles from different donors, each with its own training requirements, spare parts, and maintenance infrastructure. British Challengers and German Leopards, delivered in small batches, had to be deployed cautiously. Their limited numbers—a product of low production rates - meant they could never be supplied in decisive quantities, and the months-long delays between announcements and arrivals gave Russia ample time to adapt and prepare countermeasures.

Fast forward to Ukraine’s battlefields: Leopard 2s may be superior to T-72s and even T-90s, but when supplied in only double digits they face the same fate as the WWII Tiger tanks -outnumbered, forced into defensive roles, and unable to shape the war decisively. Ukraine has leaned heavily on more readily available infantry fighting vehicles like the U.S. Bradley, with combat footage even showing a Bradley taking on Russia’s more modern T-90s. The battlefield is making the point bluntly: in modern industrial warfare, victory goes to those who can build and replace quickly, not simply